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This dissertation consists of three self-contained papers, which are concentrated around
the topic of financial intermediation. Chapter 2 deals with the issue of concealing risk
exposure by banks in the context of risk-sensitive capital requirements. Chapter 3 an-
alyzes the role of expected income in entrepreneurial borrowing. Chapter 4 delivers a
new explanation for a stigma of failure phenomenon observed on the credit markets.
1.1 How to Make the Banks Reveal Their Risks: the
Case of Basel II
In Chapter 2 I analyze the incentives of banks to reveal their risk exposure under risk-
sensitive capital regulation. The New Basel Accord, called Basel II, gives the banks some
scope to determine their capital levels. Under the so-called IRB-approach, the banks’
capital is adjusted to their risk profiles quantified using internal risk management models.
However, Basel II creates an incentive to understate risk exposure as risk is banks’
private information and equity capital is costly. Such a behavior harms the banks’
stability because it makes capital buffers inadequate with respect to the banks’ risk
exposure. Hence, bank supervisors must be interested in curbing the banks’ incentives
to underreport their risk exposures.
I model an one-shot interaction between the bank and the supervisor, in which the bank
reports the quality of its assets, and the supervisor can inspect it as well as impose
penalties. When the bank is found out to be undercapitalized, the supervisor can use
four tools: Recapitalization, downsizing, closure or fines. The supervisor maximizes
social welfare by choosing the optimal scale of his intervention, i.e. the type of penalty
and the probability of inspection.
In this framework, I receive two sets of results. The first one is concerned with the
1
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implementation of the sensitive capital requirements. First, supervisors should use fines
to punish the management of undercapitalized banks. Second, if fines are not feasible,
policy measures for undercapitalized banks should depend on the current situation on
the capital markets. Third, supervisors should encourage recapitalization instead of
asset sales to boost capital ratios.
The second set of results delivers a conclusion that eliminating risk misreporting and
reducing pro-cyclicality of Basel II may not be feasible at the same time. The supervisor
concerned both with the amount of credit and the stability of banking sector faces a
trade-off while implementing the sensitive capital requirements. Increasing the sensitiv-
ity of the capital requirements allows the banks with high quality assets to issue more
credit, but it makes misreporting for the banks with low quality assets more valuable. I
argue that the tightness of this trade-off is counter-cyclical. In booms either additional
equity injections are costly because shareholders demand high rate of return for forgo-
ing alternative projects or banks possess huge cash flows which can be used to increase
capital ratios rather than to pay dividends. Hence, the supervisor can increase maxi-
mally the credit supply as incentives to misreport can be eliminated by threats of costly
recapitalizations. In downturns these conditions reverse and the supervisor is not able
to punish the banks adequately. Hence, he has to increase capital requirements for the
high quality banks in order to eliminate the misreporting incentives. Tightening of the
above mentioned trade-off calls for reduction in the credit supply in downturns.
The conclusion of the paper is that recent proposals to diminish the pro-cyclicality of
capital requirements can magnify the misreporting incentives of banks, increasing the
probability of their defaults.
1.2 The Creditworthiness of the Poor. A Model of
the Grameen Bank
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of expected income in entrepreneurial borrowing in the
context of microcredit programmes. We start out with several observations about the
Grameen Bank. The Grameen Bank achieves unprecedented repayment rates on their
loans despite the fact that its borrowers are qualified as the poorest of the poor. The
existing theoretical literature has proposed group liability as a reason for the success
of the Grameen Bank. However, the recent empirical evidence on the effect of group
liability is at best mixed. Moreover, the Grameen Bank ruled out explicitly the group
liability from its lending rules. We provide a novel explanation for the success of the
Grameen Bank.
First, we built a theoretical model, in which we study the dynamics of a monopolistic
3bank granting loans and taking deposits from overlapping generations of entrepreneurs
with different levels of expected income. We show that poorer individuals are safer
borrowers because they value more the relationship with the bank. Loss of the savings
technology due to strategic default is more harmful for poor borrowers who cannot
compensate the loss of consumption smoothing mechanism through high income in the
next period. Moreover, we match the evidence of the Grameen Bank that a bank will
focus on individuals with lower expected income, and will not disburse dividends until
it reaches all the potential borrowers.
Second, we find empirical support for our theoretical results using data from a household
survey from Bangladesh. We show that various measures of expected income are pos-
itively and significantly correlated with default probabilities. As measures of expected
income we use gender dummy, dowry exchanged between families at the time of the
borrower’s marriage, and the expected wage in the non-agricultural sector in the bor-
rower’s village. Moreover, we show that the gender dummy becomes insignificant after
plugging the other two measures of expected income into the regression. This hints to-
wards an economic explanation for women being better borrowers than men: Women in
Bangladesh face very low expected income. Next, we show that the Grameen Bank and
other micro-finance institutions concentrate on lending to borrowers with low expected
income, which is consistent with our claim that low expected income is a driving force
of high repayment rates in micro-finance programs.
Our paper provides interesting policy implications. A sustainable micro-finance program
should be directed towards individuals with worse outside options, i.e. poorer individ-
uals. This allows to obtain higher repayment rates crucial for a sustainable institution.
However, presence of alternative institutions that provide credit and savings to the indi-
viduals matters for a micro-finance institution. Introducing micro-finance programs in
places where other institutions already offer credit and deposits will probably result in
low repayment rates, and hence unsustainability, not only for the entrant but also for
the institution that was present before.
1.3 Endogenizing the Scope of the Stigma of Failure
Chapter 4 deals with a phenomenon of a stigma of failure, which refers to the general
public’s attitude towards entrepreneurs with a failed venture. It arises on capital markets
from the imperfect traceability of the reasons for previous bankruptcy. They leave
failed entrepreneurs exposed to discriminating behavior on the part of investors, business
partners, employees and consumers, which adversely affects the economic outcome: The
fact that a fresh start will be more difficult discourages agents to become entrepreneurs.
Besides, current entrepreneurs are induced to choose too low levels of business risk. A
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pronounced stigma of failure is therefore often blamed for hampering entrepreneurship,
innovation and growth.
Anecdotal evidence points out to a difference in the degree of stigma of failure among
developed economies. On the one extreme there are countries of continental Europe, in
which entrepreneurs take low risks and the creditors stop to provide financing to borrow-
ers only after one failure. On the other extreme there are the USA, where entrepreneurs
seem to take riskier projects and are able to obtain new financing after more than one
failure. In our paper we develop a novel explanation for these differences. The setup of
the paper allows also to study the impact of the transparency on the efficiency of credit
markets.
In our model an entrepreneur needs a loan for a project, which can be run with either high
or low risk. Its probability of success depends both on chosen risk and on entrepreneurial
skills, which are unknown to everybody. Financing is provided by competitive banking
sector. Failure of the project and risk choice provide a signal about the quality of en-
trepreneurs: When the entrepreneur takes low risk, failure reveals her as being of low
quality. Such an entrepreneur will never be financed by the banks. Failure while taking
high risk yields an imperfect signal about the quality as the good entrepreneurs could
have bad luck, and it may take several consecutive failures for agents to realize that
the entrepreneur is of low quality. Two possible outcomes may emerge: A conservative
equilibrium with one-off project financing and low risk taking, and an experimental equi-
librium with fresh project financing even after a (limited and endogenously determined)
number of failures with high risk taking.
Whether these outcomes emerge uniquely or as multiple equilibria depends on the de-
gree of transparency of lending relationship. If previous risk choices are observable,
there is a unique equilibrium which is welfare-maximizing. However, if risk choices are
unobservable, both outcomes may coexist meaning that inefficient equilibria may arise.
These results have novel implications for policy making and capital market design. First,
the results point out that small and specialized banks, which understand the business
of their clients may provide the efficient form of financing. This has implications for
the design of banking systems in developing countries. Second, if the credit markets are
plagued by asymmetric information, change of the equilibrium outcome by manipulating
the primitives of the economy will not occur without a simultaneous change in the beliefs
of all banks.
***
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. The consecutive chapters contain
the above mentioned papers. The appendix contains the appendices for the papers,
5where proofs and regression tables can be found. References for the papers are in the
last chapter of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
How to Make the Banks Reveal
Their Risks: the Case of Basel II
2.1 Introduction
The New Basel Accord, called Basel II, gives banks some scope to determine their capi-
tal levels. Under the so-called IRB-approach, banks are required to adjust their capital
to their risk profiles, which are assessed using banks’ internal risk management models.
However, as risk is private information of banks, they have an incentive to understate
their risk exposure in order to save on equity capital.1 Such a behavior can lead to
imbalances between risk profiles and equity capital used to cover them and, ultimately,
can be detrimental to the stability of the banking systems. Hence, bank supervisors
must be interested in curbing the banks’ incentives to underreport their risk exposures.
However, as the recent experience with the 2007 US sub-prime crisis has shown, mak-
ing banks reveal their risks, before a crisis event hits, can be a challenging task: The
crisis has magnified already existing concerns about the prudent use of the internal risk
management models for the computation of the risk-based capital requirements (Padoa-
Schioppa (2004), p. 48). Moreover, Basel II is silent about instruments to be used for
supervisory reviews in risk-based capital regulation (see also Kaufman (2003)). In the
light of these concerns, this paper studies the design of supervisory schemes that can be
used to elicit information about the banks’ riskiness.
In the paper, I analyze implementation of risk-based capital regulation a` la Basel II
when risk is banks’ private information.2 Capital requirements are needed to eliminate
1Significance of banks’ misreporting incentives is highlighted by Gunther and Moore (2003). They
provide evidence on the loss underreporting by banks soon after deterioration of their financial condi-
tions, independently of their initial risk exposure.
2Across the paper for the easiness of the exposition, I refer to the project’s quality rather than risk.
7
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a moral hazard problem: Inside equity capital provides incentives for banks to behave
prudently. However, the capital requirements are costly in welfare terms because capital
could be used to finance alternative projects. The supervisor has a choice between risk-
insensitive and risk-based capital requirements. Insensitive regulation requires a fixed
capital level that imposes excessive capital requirements on low risk banks.
The alternative are the risk-based capital requirements. On the one hand, they allow
to reduce capital level of low risk banks. On the other, their consequence is an adverse
selection problem because only banks know their risk profile. This reintroduces the
moral hazard issue, because high risk banks mimic low risk banks and take too little
capital in order to behave prudently. The supervisor has to design a scheme making
high risk banks report their risk truthfully.
In the paper, I model the interaction between the bank and the supervisor as a one-shot
game, in which the supervisor can inspect and impose penalties on the bank. Inspection
is costly, imperfect, stochastic and must take place early enough in order to detect
misreporting. When the supervisor receives a signal that the bank is undercapitalized,
he can punish the bank by using four instruments: Recapitalization, downsizing, closure
or fines. The supervisor chooses the optimal scale of his intervention, i.e. the type of
penalty and the probability of inspection, in order to maximize social welfare.
The supervisory instruments in my model are common in current regulation. Inspection
of banks’ risk is proposed in the Principle 2 of the Basel II Accord (BCBS (2004),
p. 162).3 Recapitalization is mentioned in the Principle 4 of Basel II Accord (BCBS
(2004), p. 165) and in the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) in the USA, which contains
also closure as a penalty.4 Downsizing is used to restore the banks’ equity levels as an
alternative for recapitalization.
In this framework, I show the following results. First, a necessary condition for the
viability of risk-based capital requirements is a high quality of inspection. Otherwise, the
high (low) risk bank misreports because the probability of being caught on misreporting
(of being punished by mistake) is too low (high).
Second, the scope of supervisory intervention depends non-trivially on the cost of equity
capital. Increase in the cost of capital fuels incentives for misreporting by making capital
more expensive. However, recapitalization and downsizing as penalties become more
harmful too. In the former case, injecting new equity is more costly. In the latter, assets
As this is immaterial for the results, it allows me to use the term ”risk” in the introduction.
3Importance of supervisory inspections is highlighted by Gunther and Moore (2003), and Ashcraft
and Bleakley (2006). The first paper shows that the supervisory inspections are a useful tool for
detecting misreporting by banks. The second paper stresses that the supervisors have better information
than market investors about banks’ exposures and the banks are able to use their private information
against the market.
4See e.g. Nieto and Wall (2006) for the overview of the PCA design.
9sold by the bank become cheaper due to increased cost of financing for investors who
buy them. Hence, a higher cost of capital allows the supervisor to intervene less often
when punishing with recapitalization and downsizing. In the case of closure, an increase
in the cost of capital has only the effect of making capital more costly. This requires
more frequent supervisory intervention.
Next, I conduct a welfare analysis. The optimal supervisory scheme implementing the
risk-based capital requirements is a combination of recapitalization and a fine. Recap-
italization eliminates moral hazard and the fine provides truthtelling incentives. Given
that fines have not yet been used to deal with undercapitalized banks,5 I compare welfare
under risk-based capital requirements implemented through recapitalization, downsiz-
ing and closure, and under risk-insensitive capital requirements. First, recapitalization
yields higher welfare than downsizing. The reason is that selling the bank’s assets to
outside investors generates profits that are not present when injecting new equity capital.
Second, the cost of capital has two effects on welfare: It affects savings on equity capital
for low risk banks and the cost of the supervisory intervention. Hence, risk-based reg-
ulation with recapitalization yields the highest welfare when the cost of capital is high,
the one with closure when this cost is intermediate, and insensitive regulation when it
is low.
The results of my paper allow to draw several policy implications for bank capital reg-
ulation when banks’ incentives to misreport their risks threaten their stability. First,
supervisors should introduce fines to punish management of undercapitalized banks.
Second, if fines cannot be introduced, supervisory policies to deal with undercapitalized
banks should depend on the situation on capital markets. When the cost of equity cap-
ital is high, supervisors should force undercapitalized banks to recapitalize. When this
cost is intermediate, undercapitalized banks should be closed and existing shareholders
substituted with new ones. When the cost of equity capital is low, risk-insensitive cap-
ital requirements should be introduced. If closures are not feasible, supervisors should
introduce insensitive capital requirements for a sufficiently low cost of capital. Given
the interpretation of the cost of the equity capital as the return on alternative outside
opportunities (see also Parlour and Plantin (2008)), the results of the model suggest the
following: Risk-based capital requirements supported by the recapitalization penalty
should be introduced in booms and risk-insensitive in downturns.6 Such an implication
contrasts with proposals that advocate an increase in capital requirements in booms to
dampen the expansion of credit and their decrease in downturns to reduce its contrac-
tion.
5Fines are mentioned neither in the PCA nor in the Basel II Accord.
6The cyclical behavior of the cost of capital may be backed by historical data on the return on equity
for the biggest U.S. banks provided in Green, Lopez and Wang (2003). Comparing this data with the
GDP growth rates in the period from 1983 to 1999 suggests that both are positively correlated.
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Third, the supervisors should force undercapitalized banks to recapitalize rather than
sell assets. The reason is that the latter leads to lower discipline than the former, because
downsizing is a source of the banks’ profits, which relax banks’ incentives to report the
risk truthfully.
Finally, supervisors should guarantee high quality of their inspections in order to make
risk-insensitive capital requirements viable. If existing risk management models cannot
distinguish between low and high risks in a timely manner (Saidenberg and Schuermann
(2003)), the temptation to misreport the risk is increased because the probability of
being caught on misreporting is small.
My theoretical framework is a version of the model by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
adapted to study financing needs of a bank with insured deposits7 and extended to
adverse selection. There exist two papers concerned with optimal risk-based capital re-
quirements when risk is banks’ private information. However, in both papers the penalty
for misreporting is exogenous, and the optimal design of supervisory intervention is not
analyzed. Prescott (2004) obtains capital requirements increasing in risk for low risk lev-
els and flat for high ones in the costly state verification setup studied by Townsend (1979)
and Gale and Hellwig (1985). Blum (2007) assumes that the penalty for misreporting
is too low to make the high risk bank report its risk truthfully. Hence, he proposes to
increase capital requirements for low risk in the Basel II Accord. My paper complements
this literature by the simultaneous design of optimal capital requirements and optimal
supervisory schemes, allowing for a broader discussion of policy implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model.
In Section 2.3 the supervisory scheme for recapitalization is derived. The same is done
for downsizing in Section 2.4 and closure in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents welfare
analysis. Section 2.7 interprets the results and contains policy implications. Section
2.8 discusses possible extensions. Section 2.9 concludes the paper. The Appendix A
contains proofs of the results.
2.2 Model
There are three agents: depositors, a bank and a supervisor.
Depositors: The depositors are fully insured. The net deposit rate is rD.
Bank: The bank is owned and managed by risk neutral shareholders protected by limited
liability. Instead of investing in the bank, the shareholders can invest in an alternative
7Models which use insured depositors instead of uninsured as it is done in the paper by Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) are also provided by Rochet (2004), and Cerasi and Rochet (2008).
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project yielding a net return δ > rD.
8 This assumption is common in the banking
literature (see e.g. Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004)). Deposits
are cheaper because they provide special services to depositors (not modelled here), like
liquidity, not available by holding stocks.9
The bank can invest in a project of size 1 financed with equity capital k and deposits
1− k. The project can be of two types i = H,L determined by nature, where H occurs
with probability pi. i is a bank’s private information. The gross return on project i
is deterministic and denoted as 1 + ri, with rH > rL > 0. Hence, both projects have
positive net present value and H is more valuable than L. The model can be easily
extended to random project returns with no change in the results.10
Instead of operating the project i, the bank can earn private benefits b, which are socially
inefficient: 1 > b.11 In such a case the project of the bank fails.
The timing is as follows. First, nature chooses i. Second, the bank learns i, determines
the level of inside equity k, and raises deposits 1− k. Third, the bank decides, whether
to operate the project i or to earn private benefits. Fourth, the returns are realized.12
The unregulated bank finances itself only with deposits because they are cheaper than
equity capital. This will be the source of a moral hazard problem when the deposit rate
is too high. The unregulated bank prefers private benefits if the profits from the project
i are lower than b:
1 + ri − (1 + rD) = ri − rD < b. (2.1)
From now on, (2.1) is assumed to hold for both i.13 Furthermore, I assume that operating
each project i is profitable under 100% equity financing:
ri − δ > 0, i = H,L. (2.2)
8From now on, terms bank and shareholders mean the same.
9Microfoundations for the assumption about deposits being cheaper than equity capital are given by
Van den Heuvel (2008).
10I could assume the following return structure: The project yields 1 + r with probability 1− pi and
1−λ with pi, where λ is the loss given default. The projects H and L would differ in pi. Such a structure
could be interpreted as a reduced form of a model underlying the Basel II capital requirements. For
a full description of this model see Repullo and Suarez (2004). This extension would allow to use the
term ”risk” explicitly.
11Alternatively, I could assume that the bank can engage in inefficient excessive risk taking. The
results remain unchanged.
12The steps 1 and 2 could be reversed. This would make solving the model more complex without
affecting its qualitative results.
13(2.1) is a simplified version of equation (3) in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), which introduces the
need for financing the bank with inside equity.
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Supervisor: The behavior of the unregulated bank resulting in its default makes the
deposit insurance liable against the depositors and leads to social costs. These costs
encompass systemic consequences of a bank failure like disruptions in payment systems
or contagion effects. Given the presence of insured deposits, there arises a need for
regulation of the bank, which aims at avoiding these social costs of its failure. The
power to regulate the bank belongs to a supervisor, who maximizes social welfare. The
supervisor cannot observe whether the bank operates the project i, but he can observe
the bank’s capital level.14 He can use this ability to eliminate the moral hazard problem
by introducing capital requirements. When the shareholders’ stake k in the bank is high
enough the bank chooses to operate the project i. Formally, the profits from operating
the project i cannot be lower than b:
1 + ri − (1− k)(1 + rD) ≥ b.
Solving this inequality yields the following Lemma, which establishes the minimum cap-
ital requirements eliminating the moral hazard problem.




. It holds that kH < kL.
The minimum capital requirements depend on i and it holds that kH < kL, because
the project L yields a lower return, for which private benefits are more desirable. ki
increases, when b and rD increase, and ri decreases. Each change of the parameters
making the project i less attractive against b requires increase in ki.
The supervisor maximizing social welfare would like to set the lowest possible capital
requirements, because equity financing is socially costly. It is so because instead of
financing the alternative project yielding δ the shareholders invest in the bank. However,
introducing the minimal capital requirements, kH and kL, would lead to an adverse
selection problem because i is bank’s private information. In such a case, the bank L
would save on capital by choosing kH and appropriate b. The bank H would choose kH
and operate the project H.
The supervisor can mitigate the adverse selection problem in two ways. The first one is
to introduce an insensitive capital requirement of kL. This eliminates moral hazard, but
it is burdensome for the bank H. The second possibility is to implement a supervisory
scheme, which would allow to implement capital requirements based on i (I call them
”sensitive capital requirements”).15 The supervisory scheme consists of two instruments:
14Of course, the supervisor would observe ex post that the bank has failed but then it is too late.
15As I do not introduce formally the notion of riskiness, calling these capital requirements ”risk-based”
would be an abuse. Using the structure proposed in the footnote 10 would allow for this.
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An inspection taking place upon the bank’s report of i and a penalty. Inspection has a
cost m, is stochastic and noisy. Without loss of generality, I focus on the case in which
the supervisor inspects with probability q when the bank reports H and there is no
inspection when the bank reports L. The supervisor detects the true i with probability
γ > 1/2 and receives a false signal with probability 1−γ.16 When the supervisor receives
a signal contrary to the bank’s report, he can impose a penalty on the bank. In the next
three sections I study the following types of penalties: Recapitalization, downsizing
and closure. Later I allow for optimal penalty design. Moreover, I assume that the
supervisor designs the supervisory scheme taking the minimum capital requirements ki
as given. Hence, I abstract from the general problem of designing capital requirements
and supervisory scheme at the same time.
The timing of the moves under regulation is as follows. First, the supervisor announces
and commits to the supervisory scheme consisting of the probability of inspection q and
a penalty. Second, nature chooses i = L,H. Third, the bank learns i, raises financing
and reports i to the supervisor. Fourth, inspection is conducted, when the report is
H. The supervisor punishes the bank when he receives a signal contrary to the report.
Fifth, the bank decides whether to operate the project i or earn private benefits. Sixth,
the returns are realized.
Finally, I introduce the following notation. If the bank operates the project i under the
capital level ki, Vi denotes its value and is equal to
Vi = 1 + ri − (1− ki)(1 + rD)− ki(1 + δ) = ri − rD − (δ − rD)ki.
2.3 Recapitalization as penalty
When the supervisor penalizes the bank L for misreporting with recapitalization, he
orders to increase the capital level from kH to x. When the truthful reporting is guar-
anteed the supervisor punishes the bank H with probability q(1− γ). The bank H loses
the difference between the cost of equity and of deposits on this additional capital level,
(δ − rD)x.17 Social welfare is the expected value of the bank minus the implementation
cost of the sensitive capital requirements:
W1 = piVH + (1− pi)VL − pi [q(1− γ)(δ − rD)x+ qm] .
16In a general case the probability of mistake would differ across i, but it is not essential for the
results.
17Increase of equity capital means on the one hand that the bank has to repay less deposits, but it
has to forgo the return on the alternative project.
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The implementation cost (the term in the square brackets) is the sum of social cost of
punishing the bank H and the expected inspection cost.
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for truthful reporting depend on the level
of x. If x ∈ (0; ∆k), where ∆k = kL − kH , the IC constraint for the bank L reads
VL ≥ b− kH(1 + δ)− qγ(1 + δ)x.
The right hand side of the constraint is the value of the bank L if it misreports. It always
appropriates b because it is either not caught on misreporting, or misreporting is detected
with probability qγ but the increase in capital level to kH + x < kL is not sufficient to
make it operate the project L. The last constraint is equivalent to x ≥ ∆k
qγ
> ∆k, which
is not compatible with x ∈ (0; ∆k).18 Hence, the punishment cannot be lower than
∆k. Furthermore, x cannot be higher than 1 − kH following the assumption that the
supervisor punishes only with recapitalization.19 For x ∈ [∆k; 1−kH ] the IC constraints
read
VH − q(1− γ)(δ − rD)x ≥ rH − rD − (δ − rD)kL,
and
VL ≥ (1− qγ) [b− kH(1 + δ)] + qγ [VL − (δ − rD)(x+ ∆k)] . (2.3)
The first (second) constraint is for the bank H (L). The left hand side of each constraint
is the bank’s value under the truthful report of i. In such a case the bank H is punished
with probability q(1− γ). The constraints’ right hand side is the bank’s value in case of
misreporting. If the bank H reports L, it operates the project H under the equity level
of kL. The bank L can earn b with probability 1− qγ and operates the project L under
the capital level of kH + x with probability qγ. Both constraints can be rewritten as:
∆k
q(1− γ) ≥ x (2.4)






− (1 + rD)
)
(2.5)
18Simplification is obtained by using the definition of ki from Lemma 1.
19In a more general setup the penalty would be bounded by the participation constraint. This is
explored in Subsection 2.8.1.
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for the bank L. x has to be high enough to make the bank L report its true type.
However, it has to be bounded from above in order not to discourage the truthful report
by the bank H, which may be punished if it reports truthfully. Formally, the supervisory
scheme induces truthful reporting for both types, when x lies in the interval implied by
(2.4) and (2.5). This interval is not empty if the upper bound on x from (2.4) is not











Moreover, the IC constraints intersect at q = q̂ and the IC constraint for the bank L
is steeper than for the bank H. Thus, in order to preserve the truth-telling incentives,
marginal decrease of q requires higher increase in x for the bank L than for the bank
H. The reason is that by misreporting the bank L not only saves on capital but is able
to appropriate b not available for the bank H. The incentive compatible set (q;x) is
depicted by the grey area in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The incentive compatible set of (q;x) is depicted with grey. ICH and ICL
are the incentive compatibility constraints for the bank H and L.
Incentive compatible combinations of (q;x) are feasible if they satisfy q ∈ [0; 1] and
x ∈ [∆k; 1 − kH ]. Otherwise, the sensitive capital requirements are not viable, as the
available tools (inspection and recapitalization) are not sufficient to eliminate incentives
for misreporting. The following Lemma delivers the necessary condition for implemen-
tation of the sensitive capital requirements with recapitalization as penalty.
Lemma 2 The necessary condition for implementation of the sensitive capital require-
ments with recapitalization as penalty is a sufficiently high quality of inspection
γ.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Quality of inspection has to be high enough in order to make the sensitive capital
requirements with recapitalization feasible. Otherwise either 100% equity financing (x =
1− kH) is not enough to discipline the bank L or the bank H finds misreporting better
when it is punished too harsh.
Moreover, the supervisor can be constrained in the choice of q by (2.6), if for any γ
satisfying Lemma 2 the intersection of (2.4) and (2.5) lies in the region q ∈ [0; 1] and
x ∈ [∆k; 1 − kH ]. The following Lemma establishes necessary and sufficient condition
for which the supervisor can ignore (2.6) while choosing the optimal q, given that the
sensitive capital requirements are feasible.
Lemma 3 The supervisor is not constrained by (2.6) if and only if the return on the
project H or the quality of inspection is high enough.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The last Lemma is stronger than the previous one, because it makes (2.4) redundant.
The participation constraints can be ignored, because they are implied by the IC con-
straints.
When parameters satisfy conditions of Lemma 3 holds the supervisor solves the following
program while choosing the optimal supervisory scheme:
max
q,x
W1, s.t.: (2.5), q ∈ [0; 1], x ∈ [∆k; 1− kH ].
As (2.5) binds at the optimum, it can be inserted into W1, and after ignoring the terms
independent of q and x, what yields an expression to be maximized under the remaining
constraints: q (m−m), where m ≡ (1 − γ)(rH − rL). When the cost of inspection is
higher (lower) than m, it is optimal to choose the lowest (highest) possible q. The result
is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 If the conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied, the optimal supervisory scheme



















∆k(1+δ)+(δ−rD)(1−kL) ; 1− kH
)
,
if m ≤ m
if m > m
Comparative statics of the optimal solution is intuitive as every change of parameters
undermining the bank L’s truth-telling incentives (increases in rH , b and rD as well as
decreases in δ, rL and γ) requires increase in q1 for m > m and in x for m ≤ m. The
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most interesting comparative statics result concerns the change in δ. Although higher δ
increases the incentives to misreport in the first place because equity financing becomes
more expensive, it makes also penalty more expensive. This effect diminishes incentives
of the bank L to misreport its type and allows the supervisor to decrease the scope of
his intervention.
2.4 Downsizing as penalty
The alternative possibility to adjust the capital structure of the bank, after the supervisor
has received a signal contrary to report, is to make the bank reduce its size (downsize) to
at least sA by selling part of its project.
20 In order to increase the capital ratio through
downsizing the bank has to repay at least part of the deposits using the proceeds from
selling. I introduce new agents into the model: Risk-neutral investors interested in
buying the bank’s project, which has not matured yet. Timing of the moves is modified
as follows. First, the supervisor announces q and sA. Second, nature chooses i. Third,
the bank learns i, finances itself and reports i to the supervisor. Fourth, the supervisor
inspects with probability q upon receiving report of H and orders downsizing to at least
sA when he receives signal contrary to the report. Fifth, the bank chooses how much of
the project it sells, (1− s) ≥ (1− sA). Sixth, the investors pay (1 + p) for every unit of
the project. Seventh, the bank decides whether to operate the project i or earn private
benefits. Eighth, the returns are realized.
The investors operate on a competitive market and have the cost of capital δ like the
bank’s shareholders, but they do not have any access to the insured deposits and finance
themselves with their own wealth. The investors are able to observe sA, q, the bank’s
initial capital level and the project’s size (1 − s) the bank wants to sell. They have
homogenous prior beliefs about the type of the bank, equal to the probabilities according
to which the nature draws the bank’s type. After observing the relevant variables, the
investors build their beliefs βi about the type i of the bank that offers to sell (1− s).21
Given the beliefs, the investors pay a price (1 +p) (p is called a premium) for unit of the
sold project such that their participation constraint is binding, i.e. the expected cash
flow from one unit of the project they buy covers their cost of financing:
1 + βHrH + βLrL = (1 + p)(1 + δ).
20I assume that the project is perfectly divisible.
21For the ease of exposition, I suppress in the notation the fact that the investors’ beliefs are a function
of what they observe. The bank’s initial capital level is irrelevant for the investors’ beliefs, because the
investors are concerned about the bank’s type only if the bank sells, and this may occur only when the
initial capital level is kH .
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The premium is then
p =
βHrH + βLrL − δ
1 + δ
.
The punished bank raises (1 − s)(1 + p) from selling of (1 − s) of the project. From
these proceeds, (1− s) has to be used to repay the deposits at par (as they have not yet
matured) if s ∈ (kH ; 1]. If s ∈ [0; kH), the bank has to repay all deposits (1 − kH) and
return (kH − s) to the shareholders. The rest, (1 − s)p, is invested into the alternative
project yielding δ. Downsizing can be used to increase the capital ratio in absence of
other instruments only if p ≥ 0, which is guaranteed by (2.2).22 When the bank sells
(1 − s) of the project and operates it, it earns s(1 + ri) on the remaining part of the
project and (1−s)p(1+δ) from investing of the remains of the proceeds in the alternative
project. If s ∈ [0; kH), the bank is fully equity financed and, moreover, the shareholders
invest the returned (kH − s) in the alternative project too. If s ∈ (kH ; 1], the bank’s
profit from operating the project i after downsizing is:
s(1 + ri) + (1− s)p(1 + δ)− (s− kH)(1 + rD)
= s [ri − rD − (βHrH + βLrL − δ)] + βHrH + βLrL − δ + (1 + rD)kH .
If βHrH + βLrL− δ > ri− rD, the bank would sell the whole project. I assume that this
is precluded for any type of the bank and for any beliefs. This condition guarantees that
the downsizing ordered by the supervisor constitutes a penalty for the bank if s ∈ (kH ; 1].
The sufficient condition for this is
rL ≥ δ > rD + (rH − rL). (2.7)
(2.7) is not empty if and only if
rH < 2rL − rD. (2.8)
(2.7) and (2.8) assumed from that point on. If s ∈ [0; kH ], the bank’s profit after
downsizing is
s(1 + ri) + (1− s)p(1 + δ) + (kH − s)(1 + δ)
= s(ri − (βHrH + βLrL)) + βHrH + βLrL − δ + (1 + δ)kH .
22See Section 2.8.4 for the discussion of the case when the bank’s assets are specific in the sense that
the outside investors cannot generate their full value after having purchased them.
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The bank H is penalized by downsizing if βH < 1, but is indifferent for βH = 1. However,
the bank L finds it profitable to be downsized if βL < 1 or is indifferent if βL = 1.
Furthermore, I establish levels of s for which moral hazard does not exist after downsiz-
ing. I assume that the private benefits are proportionate to the size of the bank. After
downsizing the bank L does not engage in the moral hazard if:
s(1+rL)+(1−s)p(1+δ)−(1+rD)(s−kH) ≥ max[sb; sb+(1−s)p(1+δ)−(1+rD)(s−kH)].23
s preventing moral hazard has to fulfill:
0 ≤ s ≤ p(1 + δ) + kH(1 + rD)
p(1 + δ) + kL(1 + rD)
≡ sMH(p).24
sMH(p) depends on the investors’ beliefs about the type of the selling bank through p.
The model is solved as follows. After the supervisor’s announcement of q and sA, the
bank engages in a game with the investors, in which it chooses a profile of strategies
prescribing the report and the amount of project sold, (1−s) ≥ (1−sA).25 The investors
build their beliefs upon observing q, sA and s, and pay (1+p) consistent with the bank’s
optimal strategies. The bank’s optimal strategy profile has to be consistent with the
investors’ beliefs. I define a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of this game as follows26:
Definition A Bayes-Nash Equilibrium given q and sA is characterized by:
• The bank’s optimal reporting, i˜ = H,L, and selling strategies, s ≤ sA, given
the investors’ beliefs βH and βL, and
• The investors’ conditional beliefs βH and βL about the bank’s type that




This game has many equilibria, which can be categorized according to the bank’s re-
porting strategies: Both types (i) report truthfully, (ii) report L, (iii) misreport, and
(iv) report H. In equilibria of the last two types, the bank L fails with some probability.
Given the assumption that the cost of bank failure is high enough to make the supervi-
sor prevent this, I do not discuss these equilibria. I concentrate on those of the type (i)
and (ii), and use the intuitive criterion to narrow the set of equilibria. From then on,
23For s ∈ [0; kH ] moral hazard problem does not exist.
25As the supervisor commits to q and sA he is not an active player in the game.
26I restrict myself only to equilibria in pure strategies.
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I call the equilibria of type (i) ”truth-telling equilibrium” and of the type (ii) ”pooling
equilibrium”.
In the truth-telling equilibrium, the only type that may sell is H and the amount that
it sells is precisely (1− sA) because it is not profitable to sell more. Then, q and sA have
to be such that the bank L does not misreport. In such a case, the investors observing




. Unlike in the case of recapitalization, the IC constraints have three different
forms depending on sA. If sA ∈ [0; kH ], both types are fully equity financed and for
sA ∈ (kH ; sMH(pH)] they retain some deposits. In both cases, the bank L would operate
the project L if it mimicked H. If sA ∈ (sMH(pH); 1], both types still retain some
deposits, but the bank L would appropriate b after downsizing. The IC constraints have
familiar form (for the bank H and L respectively):
[1− q(1− γ)]VH + q(1− γ)VH(sA) ≥ VH − (δ − rD)∆k (2.9)
and




sA(rH − δ) + (1− sA)pH(1 + δ), for sA ∈ [0; kH)




sA(rL − δ) + (1− sA)pH(1 + δ), for sA ∈ [0; kH)
sA(rL − rD) + (1− sA)pH(1 + δ)− (δ − rD)kH , for sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)]
sAb− (1 + δ)kH , for sA ∈ (sMH(pH); 1]
Finding constellations of sA and q for which the truth-telling equilibrium exists, i.e.
constellations satisfying (2.9) and (2.10) that are feasible, follows the analog pattern as
in Section 2.3. Hence, I obtain an analogue of Lemma 2.
Lemma 5 For each interval sA ∈ [0; kH ], sA ∈ (kH ; sMH(pH)] and sA ∈ (sMH(pH); 1]
the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the quality of inspection is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Moreover, for sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)], the regulator may be constrained in the choice of q by
the intersection of the IC constraints as for the recapitalization. The following Lemma
provides the conditions when this is irrelevant.27
Lemma 6 When the truth-telling equilibrium exists, the supervisor is not constrained
in the choice of q if and only if the quality of inspection is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The pooling equilibrium can be supported by the beliefs βL = 1, i.e. when the investors
observe that a bank sells 1 − sA, they attach the type L to it. The following Lemma
establishes the conditions under which the pooling equilibrium exists.
Lemma 7 Pooling equilibrium always exists for sA ∈ [kH ; 1]. There is no pooling
equilibrium for sA ∈ [0; kH).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Furthermore, there are constellations of sA and q in which the truth-telling and pooling
equilibria coexist.28 Under βL = 1 selling is less attractive for both types of the bank,
hence reporting H gets less attractive for some sA for which the truth-telling equilibrium
arises. However, the pooling equilibrium does not survive the intuitive criterion in the
region where both equilibria coexist. The reason is that the bank H can deviate by
reporting its type and this is not profitable for the bank L.




W2 = pi [(1− q(1− γ))VH + q(1− γ)VH(sA)− qm] + (1− pi)VL.
s.t.:
(2.10), s ∈ [0; 1] and q ∈ [0; 1].
The optimal solution is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 When the conditions from Lemmas 5 and 6 hold, the optimal supervisory














if m ≤ m





if m ≤ m
if m > m.
27For the case of downsizing it is not easy to combine the conditions from Lemma 5 with the conditions
for which the supervisor is not constrained in the choice of q as it is done in the case of recapitalization.
28It is easy to verify by simply comparing the IC constraints for both equilibria.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The comparative statics of the optimal solution is the same as for the case of recapital-
ization. Higher δ allows to decrease the scope of the supervisory intervention because
the higher cost of financing for the investors is passed onto the bank in the form of a
lower premium, increasing the disciplining effect of downsizing.
2.5 Closure as penalty
An alternative way of punishing the bank for misreporting is to intervene and transfer
it to new shareholders. The new shareholders run the bank with the capital level of
kL preventing reoccurrence of the moral hazard problem. I assume the closure and the
transfer have social cost of S. The supervisor maximizes
W3 = pi [VH − q(1− γ)(S + (δ − rD)∆k)− qm] + (1− pi)VL.
Social cost of the penalty amounts to S and to the increase in the capital requirements
to kL. Because the penalty is fixed and W3 is decreasing in q the supervisor chooses the
smallest q that is incentive compatible.
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints read (for the bank H and L respectively)
[1− q(1− γ)]VH ≥ VH − (δ − rD)∆k and VL ≥ (1− qγ) [b− kH(1 + δ)] .
The constraints differ from (2.3) only in one detail. The bank H (L) receives nothing
with probability q(1− γ) when it reports truthfully (qγ when it misreports).







q3 cannot be higher than 1 and has to be incentive compatible for the bank H. Both




rH − rD − (δ − rD)kH ;
1 + δ
1 + 2δ − rD
}
.29 (2.11)
This condition is the analogue of Lemma 3.
29The first term comes from the condition q2 ≤ 1. The second arises after inserting q2 into the
incentive compatibility constraint of the bank H.
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There is one difference in the comparative statics results for q3 with respect to the
previous two cases: q3 is increasing in δ. The reason is that in case of closure the only
effect that δ has on the incentives to misreport is the effect on the cost of bank’s financing
with equity. If δ increases, equity financing becomes more expensive making the bank
L more willing to misreport. This requires increase in the probability of inspection.
2.6 Welfare analysis
This section starts with welfare comparison of the sensitive capital requirements with
recapitalization and downsizing as penalties, which leads to the following Lemma.
Proposition 1 If the conditions from Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 are satisfied, the sensitive
capital requirements with recapitalization as penalty deliver strictly higher welfare
than those with downsizing as penalty.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reason why recapitalization as penalty delivers higher welfare is that downsizing is
a less severe penalty. As downsizing creates profits in the form of positive premium for
the bank, the IC constraint for the bank L tightens requiring an increase in the scope
of the supervisory intervention.
Next, I consider the insensitive capital requirements of kL for both banks. Social welfare
from this type of regulation is
W0 = piVH + (1− pi)VL − pi(δ − rD)∆k.
The last term is social cost of the insensitive capital requirements: The bank H bears
too high equity cost. First, I compare this type of capital requirements with the sensitive
ones with recapitalization as penalty. The difference in social welfare between them is
∆W1 = W1 −W0 = pi [(δ − rD)∆k − q1(1− γ)(δ − rD)x1 − q1m] .
∆W1 is the difference between social benefits of lowering the regulatory burden on the
bank H and the implementation cost of the sensitive capital requirements with recap-
italization. The following Proposition establishes constellations of γ and δ for which
∆W1 > 0.
Proposition 2 For each δ ∈ (rD; rL) there is γ1(δ) > 1/2 such that the sensitive capital
requirements with recapitalization yield strictly higher welfare than the insensitive
24 CHAPTER 2. MISREPORTING OF RISK AND BASEL II
capital requirements for γ > γ1(δ), and strictly lower welfare otherwise. The
function γ1(δ) is strictly decreasing in δ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The Proposition 2 states that the sensitive capital requirements with recapitalization
dominate in welfare terms the insensitive ones when the inspection quality γ and the cost
of equity δ are sufficiently high. Higher γ is beneficial because the bankH is punished less
frequently and it allows to decrease the scope of the supervisory intervention. Higher δ
translates to higher savings for the bankH on equity capital and to a stronger disciplining
effect of recapitalization as penalty. The positive effects of γ and δ on ∆W1 create a
trade-off between them, which is reflected in γ1(δ) being strictly decreasing. The result
from Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 2.2. The line γ(m) separates the two cases
arising in Lemma 3: The case with m > m is relevant above this line and m < m below.
The region above of γ1(δ) represents constellations of δ and γ, for which the sensitive
capital requirements deliver higher social welfare than the insensitive ones. Below γ1(δ)
the opposite holds.
Figure 2.2: The dominance region of the sensitive capital requirements with recapital-
ization is depicted in grey.
Second, I compare welfare from the insensitive and the sensitive capital requirements
with closure as penalty. The difference in social welfare is
∆W3 = W3 −W0 = pi [(δ − rD)∆k [1− q3 (1− γ)]− q3 (m+ S(1− γ))] .
The following Proposition summarizes the result of the comparison.
Proposition 3 For each δ ∈ (rD; rL) there is γ2(δ) > 1/2 such that the sensitive capital
requirements with closure yield strictly higher welfare than the insensitive capital
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requirements for γ > γ2(δ), and strictly lower welfare otherwise. The function
γ2(δ) is first decreasing and then increasing in δ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The increasing cost of capital has two countervailing effects on ∆W3. The first effect
leads to higher savings on equity for the bank H. The second effect is increase in q3
due to stronger incentives to misreport. The result may be a non-monotonic frontier
separating the dominance regions as depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The dominance region of the sensitive capital requirements with closure is
depicted in grey.
Finally, I compare social welfare for the sensitive capital requirements with recapitaliza-
tion and closure as penalty.30 The difference in social welfare is
∆W31 = W3 −W1 = pi [(q1 − q3)m+ (1− γ)(δ − rD) [q1x1 − q3∆k]− (1− γ)q3S] .















S consists of the differences in the expected inspection cost (the first term) and in
the social cost of increase in capital requirements (the second term) between these two
penalties. The derivation of the last expression with respect to δ delivers the following
proposition.
30I skip the comparison of the sensitive capital requirements with downsizing because they provide
lower welfare than those with recapitalization.
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Proposition 4 For m > m S is decreasing function of δ. For m < m S is first increasing
in δ and then decreasing in δ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. First, S decreases with δ due to the
different impact of increase in δ on the truth-telling incentives: q3 increases, while q1
either decreases (for m > m) or does not change (for m ≤ m). This affects both terms
in S negatively. Second, S increases with δ due to welfare loss from increased difference
between the cost of capital and deposits, (δ− rD). It turns out that for sufficiently high
m the former effect on S is always stronger leading to S decrease with δ. For low m S
increases and then decreases with δ.
The last three propositions allow for a general conclusion that the sensitive capital re-
quirements with recapitalization as penalty deliver the highest welfare when δ is high,
the one with closure for intermediate δ and the insensitive ones for low δ. This re-
sult can be obtained analytically only for m > m. A frontier yielding ∆W31 = 0 in
the (δ; γ)-diagram, γ31(δ), is increasing and recapitalization delivers higher welfare for
constellations below of this frontier for sufficiently high S.
Figure 2.4: The dominance regions of the three different types of capital requirements.
The dominance region of the capital requirements with recapitalization is depicted with
dark grey, the ones with closure with light grey and the insensitive ones are without
color.
Figure 2.4 depicts the results of the last three propositions for the case m > m.31 It
highlights also the importance of high γ for welfare yielded by the sensitive capital
31I do not provide a figure for the case m < m as it is similar to Figure 2.4.
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requirements with closure. If γ is too low, it precludes that closure yields the highest
welfare because the bank is closed too often.
2.7 Interpretation of the results and policy implica-
tions
2.7.1 Quality of inspection
A necessary condition for the viability of the sensitive capital requirements is sufficiently
high γ (see Lemma 2, 5 and (2.11)). Under Basel II, γ corresponds to the ability of
supervisors to assess how well the internal risk management models reflect banks’ risk
exposures. However, these models may not be suitable for credit risk (Saidenberg and
Schuermann (2003)). As default events are rare, especially in booms, such models may
fail to deliver conclusive results about risks borne by banks. Only in downturns, when
the defaults tend to cluster, supervisors may distinguish between banks with low and
high risk. Similar situation occurred in the period prior to the 2007 US sub-prime
crisis. Risk management models had failed to reveal what risks the banks had had on
their books, before the crisis event hit. The implication for supervisors is to improve
qualifications of its personnel in detecting such flawed risk management models and to
encourage banks to work on improving them. In what follows it is take for granted that
the supervisor is able to make the banks reveal their risks.
2.7.2 Downsizing
Supervisors should encourage undercapitalized banks to recapitalize rather than to down-
size. The former constitutes a harsher punishment for banks than the latter due to the
adverse selection issue in case of selling to the outside investors and allows for lower scope
of supervisory intervention. This constitutes an additional argument for recapitalization
rather than asset sales in order to boost capital ratios. In the current crisis, the asset
sales conducted to protect banks’ capital ratios have been said to have contagious effects
between the banks.
2.7.3 Optimal capital requirements and economic cycles
The welfare analysis of the previous Section implies that the capital requirements should
depend on the cost of equity capital, which influences both the incentives to reveal risks
and the social cost of capital regulation. Sensitive capital requirements deliver the high-
est welfare for upper levels of δ, provided they are supported with recapitalization for
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high δ or with closure for intermediate δ. Otherwise, the supervisor should introduce
insensitive capital requirements for low δ, because the burden from high capital require-
ments for the banks with high-quality assets is negligible with respect to the cost of
implementation of the sensitive scheme.
δ is interpreted as the overall profitability of the projects in the economy, suggesting
that δ is higher in booms than in downturns.32 Hence, supervisors should support sen-
sitive capital requirements with recapitalization during booms, when additional equity
injections mean a loss of highly profitable investment opportunities alternative to the
banks projects. During downturns, either sensitive capital requirements with closures
or insensitive capital requirements (if closures are not feasible) should be introduced.
Making capital requirements sensitive in booms and insensitive in downturns opposes
current proposals to increase them in booms and lower in downturns in order to eliminate
magnification of the economic cycles.
In order to gain more perspective on the link between the supply of credit and the
misreporting incentives across the cycle, in what follows I endogenize the size of the
bank.
2.7.4 Endogenous credit supply
An extension of the basic model
I consider the following modification of the model presented in Section 2.2. The share-
holders of the bank have A of equity capital like in Rochet (2004). Moreover, at the
time of the report of the type by the bank to the supervisor the bank receives short-term
profits d (Tirole (2006), p. 201-202).33 I assume that when d occurs there are no other
opportunities of investing it in the bank. Only if d is paid out as a dividend to the
shareholders it can deliver the return 1 + δ < 1 + rL.
34 d is independent of i, which
is not crucial for the results. The private benefits b are proportional to the size of the
bank. The timing of events is as follows. First, the supervisor announces the probability
of inspection q and the equity injection r in case if the bank is found to be undercap-
italized.35 Second, the nature reveals i to the bank, the bank raises Di of deposits to
finance Ii of loans, where Ii ≤ A + Di.36 Third, the supervisor inspects the bank and
32For a similar interpretation see Parlour and Plantin (2008) and for the evidence on the pro-cyclical
behavior of the cost of equity capital for the U.S. banks see Green, Lopez and Wang (2003).
33Sources of these short-term profits can encompass revenues from other business lines of the bank
which are unspecified here.
34An equivalent assumption is to allow for additional lending opportunities, which are less profitable
than the existing project.
35I discuss the other forms of punishment later in the Section.
36I assume that deposits pay a rate of return 0.
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forces equity injection r using short-term profits if the signal upon inspection is contrary
to the report.37 Fourth, there is moral hazard problem. Finally, the returns are realized.
I interpret the bank in the modification of the model as being representative for the
whole banking sector. This allows me to interpret the bank’s size as an overall credit
supply in the banking sector.38
The setup is analog to the one presented in the Section 2.3 with the difference that the
amount of shareholders’ wealth which can be used as equity capital is bounded. Hence,
the supervisor chooses the size of the bank depending on i given A and d. The program
of the supervisor reads:
max
Ii,Di,q,r
pi [(1 + rH)IH −DH + d(1 + δ)− q(1− γ)δr − qm]
+(1− pi) [(1 + rL)IL −DL + d(1 + δ)]
s.t.:
(1 + rL)IL −DL + d(1 + δ) ≥ (1− qγ) [bIH + d(1 + δ)]
+qγ [max [(1 + rL)IH − (DH − r); bIH ] + (d− r)(1 + δ)]
(1 + rH)IH −DH + d(1 + δ)− q(1− γ)δr ≥ (1 + rH)IL −DL + d(1 + δ)
(1 + ri)Ii −Di ≥ bIi for i = H,L
Ii ≤ A+Di for i = H,L
r ≤ d
The objective function is expected social welfare. The injection of r as equity capital
is socially costly because the shareholders loose return on the dividends. The next two
expressions are the truthtelling constraints for the bank L and H respectively. The
following two expressions represent the moral hazard and balance sheet constraints for
both types. The last constraint is the upper bound on the equity injection. This con-
straint could be relaxed by allowing for outside financing through additional equity or
a partial sale of the existing project. I discuss these possibilities later. The solution to
the program is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 For high monitoring cost m, the socially optimal supply of credit is
Ii =
A
b−rL for both types of bank. Otherwise, the socially optimal supply of credit
Ii depends on i in the following way. For the bank L it is always IL =
A
b−rL . For
the bank H it is:
37Here the equity injection is equivalent to retention of dividends.
38A very interesting extension of the model involves strategic interaction between banks in their choice
of reporting strategies. This extension is my current work in progress.
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• IH = Ab−rH if the short-term profits d are sufficiently high,
• otherwise IH has to be restricted and smaller than Ab−rH .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition states that the optimal size of the bank depends on the ability of
the supervisor to punish the banks for misreporting.39 If the short term profits d are
sufficiently high, a loss from retaining dividends is large and the incentives to misreport
are low. Hence, the supervisor allows both banks to issue credit up to a level at which
they become indifferent between the project i and the private benefits. However, if d
is low and the shareholders do not have much too loose by retaining the dividends, the
supervisor restricts the supply of credit for the bank H in order to reduce the incentives
to misreport.
It is plausible to argue that the short-term profits are pro-cyclical. In such a case the
supervisor concerned about the amount of credit in the economy and the stability of
the banking system has to compromise between these two objectives. The consequence
in downturns is a restriction of the credit supply for the banks with high-quality assets
(i = H) aimed at removing incentives to misreport for the banks in worse conditions
(i = L). The trade off between the supply of credit and banks’ stability relaxes in good
times, when the supervisor is able to threat banks with high penalties for misreporting,
and tightens in downturns, when the sources for recapitalization are scarce. In the
latter case, the supervisor has to restrict the supply of credit issued by the banks in
better conditions. Furthermore, the severity of a downturn determines the degree of
the reduction of the credit supply. If the downturn is not too severe the decrease in IH
with respect to A
b−rH will not be too strong. However, if the downturn is very strong,
making d very low, the credit supply will be independent of the banks’ asset quality and
restricted to A
b−rL .
The main conclusion is that: (i) in booms the supervisor should implement sensitive
capital requirements, and (ii) in recessions the sensitivity of capital requirements should
be reduced. Relaxing the capital requirements in order to boost the credit supply in
recessions is not compatible with the increased temptation of banks with the lower asset
quality to misreport their type.
The most important caveat to the above conclusion is that once the supervisor is able to
implement sensitive capital requirements the increase in the credit supply by the banks
H in booms has only a positive effect on the social welfare. It is sometimes argued
that expansion of credit in booms may endanger the macroeconomic stability. In order
to address these arguments, one has to study mechanisms underlying them within the
39This result is similar to the main result in Blum (2008). He shows that when the penalty for
misreporting is very low, the supervisor may introduce leverage ratio restriction.
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model presented here.40 I comment on these arguments in two ways.
First, one could show in the model that rewarding banks with lower capital requirements
for high quality loans in booms may lead to increase in the stability of banking system.
This could be shown by adding to the existing model risk and imperfect correlation
between the types of loans. Sensitive capital requirements in booms result in an increase
of the share of high quality loans with respect to the ones of low quality when compared
with the case of the insensitive capital requirements. Due to the imperfect correlation
the increased amount of loans of type H would provide a buffer against the losses from
the loans of type L.41
Second, there is some concern that in booms the banks relax their lending standards.
Hence, allowing them to expand the credit supply by making capital requirements sensi-
tive to risk would relax these standards even further. However, if the supervisors are able
to make the banks report risks truthfully this argument is not so obvious any more. As
the sensitive capital requirements punish taking higher risks with an increase in capital
requirements, relaxing lending standards maybe be dampened or even reversed. Con-
sider the following extension of the above model. Before the nature reveals i, the bank
can influence the probability of occurrence of H, pi, by exerting effort with a cost 1
2
cpi2.
The bank chooses pi in order to maximize the following expression:
max
pi
pi [(1 + rH)IH −DH + d(1 + δ)− q(1− γ)δr]
+(1− pi) [(1 + rL)IL −DL + d(1 + δ)]− 1
2
cpi2.
pi chosen by the bank increases with IH , and decreases with IL, q and r. The program of
the supervisor becomes a little more complicated as pi is now a function of the supervisory
scheme. However, the crucial thing is that the sensitive capital requirements would
encourage banks to increase effort in order to become of type H, making sensitive capital
requirements in booms even more attractive for the supervisor. This conclusion hints
towards an idea that the anti-cyclicality of capital requirements embedded in Basel II
may not have necessarily adverse effects as banks would be encouraged to look for assets
of high quality and their share would increase in the banks’ portfolios.42
I will discuss now the possibility of punishing the bank with other measures.
First, downsizing is again the less efficient way to punish the bank than recapitalization
40See Gordy and Howell (2006) for the presentation of these arguments.
41For the impact of imperfect correlation between different types of loans on the capital buffers see
Martinez-Miera (2009), and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2009).
42It may be possible that the supervisor makes the capital requirements for the bank L non-binding
in order to encourage more efforts to screen the borrowers.
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due to adverse selection issues.43 One way in which the downsizing may dominate
recapitalization is that it is not constrained by the amount of short term profits received
by the bank.
Second, another possibility of recapitalization is to use outside equity. Outside equity
makes recapitalization attractive for two reasons: No explicit bound on the amount of
equity injected such as d may exist, and outside financing does not create a social loss,
as it is a transfer between inside and outside shareholders. However, outside equity
tightens the moral hazard constraint of the bank L as the inside shareholders’ return
on the project is diluted. This dilution restricts the ability of the supervisor to enforce
truthtelling. Moreover, the outside investors require a sufficient injection of inside eq-
uity by the existing shareholders because otherwise the moral hazard constraint will be
violated. Hence, the overall impact of outside equity financing on the social welfare is
not clear, and it can only be better than pure inside recapitalization when d is high.
Market discipline, capital requirements, and economic cycles
In this subsection I comment on the impact of the Pillar 3 of the Basel II on the
misreporting incentives. The Pillar 3 incorporates the market discipline as a factor
which could incentivize the banks to report truthfully their risks. Such a provision
could be successful if the investors receive reliable information about the quality of
banks’ assets in a timely manner. However, the evidence on the positive effect of market
discipline on the banks’ behavior is mixed as reported by Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006).
In accordance with their results I assume that the outside investors are not able to
discipline the banks. They show that the supervisors possess in the short run better
information than the market, and the banks are able to use this information to exploit
the outside investors. Moreover, Gunther and Moore (2003) provide evidence for the
usefulness of the supervisory review process in detecting misreporting of information by
the banks.
I take the following stance about the combination of all three pillars of the Basel II.
The outside investors provide additional capital for banks to issue new loans and the
supervisor ensures that the banks provide reliable information by means of inspecting
and punishing the banks. In such a setup the market discipline impact as described
above is not present. However, the market plays still a crucial role in the enforcement
of the sensitive capital requirements. If the supervisor commits to the inspection and
penalty, and they are sufficiently high to discourage misreporting, the outside investors
will provide amount of capital that is sensitive to the information provided by the banks.
43When the bank is told to decrease its leverage by ∆ through selling of S assets, the investors pay
1+rH
1+δ for each $ of the assets in the truthelling equilibrium. Misreporting is less costly for the bank L
than in case of recapitalization as the cost of punishment is partly shifted to the outside investors.
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Hence the banks with high quality assets will be able to issue more credit than the
banks with low quality assets because the market will require lower share of the inside
equity from the former than from the latter.44 If the outside investors do not believe in
the supervisory power to enforce Basel II, the sensitive capital requirements cannot be
implemented and the market enforces own capital requirements, which are insensitive
and correspond to the ones for the banks of low quality.
The immediate implication is that the success of the implementation of the Basel II
using outside investors depends on the supervisory ability to make the banks reveal
their risks. This conclusion has consequence for the ability of the supervisors to change
the degree of sensitivity of the capital requirements. As long as the outside investors
believe that the supervisor is able to recognize quality of banks’ assets they will provide
financing sensitive to the information provided by the banks. However, if this ability
is not guaranteed, the outside investors will judge the banks by the worst quality and
will require high amounts of inside equity to support additional injections of outside
financing. This will mean that all banks could issue only limited amount of credit.
Hence, any trials to boost credit supply from the side of the supervisors by reducing the
sensitivity of capital requirements will be fruitless as the market will not allow the banks
to issue more credit than it finds to be appropriate under the current circumstances. This
hints again on the trade-off between making the capital requirements less sensitive to
risk and misreporting incentives, which relies on the ability of the supervisor to enforce
truthtelling on the side of the banks.
The last conclusion is supported by the anecdotal evidence from the current financial
crisis. First, the investors have been judging during the crisis the strength of the banks
by the simple leverage ratio abandoning any risk-weighted measures of equity capital
structure after losing confidence in the valuation and risk assessment of banks’ assets
(IMF (2008), p. 20). Second, the Financial Times from the 21st of January 2009 reports
that ”some investors say the FSA’s decision [to allow the banks to use over-the cycle-
ratings rather than point-in-time ones to calculate Basel II capital requirements] will
merely add to suspicions that banks are using questionable calculations to hide bad
loans”. Hence, the market may prevent the banks from issuing more credit than the
supervisor may wish as it fears that misreporting can be even more severe especially
when the risk positions of the banks remain unknown.
44The formal model is presented in Appendix A and it is a straightforward extension of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) to adverse selection. The difference to the model presented in Section 2.2 is that this
time the investors are as in the original paper by Holmstrom and Tirole, i.e. they are not protected by
deposit insurance.
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Summary of the results
The results from the latter subsection are the same as from the former one: In a crisis
the ability of the supervisor to boost credit supply is limited by the increased temptation
for misreporting. In both cases, the crisis situation is characterized by the limited ability
of the supervisor to enforce the truthtelling. In the former case, the consequence is that
the supervisor has to reduce the sensitivity of the capital requirements by limiting the
amount of credit issued by low risk banks in order to decrease the incentives to misreport.
In the latter, the outside investors do not trust the bank’s information and provide
financing according to the worst quality available on the market, thereby prohibiting
low risk banks to issue high amount of credit. The consequence is that a supervisor
concerned about the amount of credit in the economy and about the probability of
default of the bank may be trapped in a trade off between these two in a crisis situation.
Issuing high volume of credit may not be possible, if the misreporting incentives are
strong.
2.8 Extensions
2.8.1 Fine as a penalty
Formally, closure equals to making the payoff of the existing shareholders to 0. This
could also be achieved through a combination of recapitalization, downsizing and a
fine f , without involving cost of closure. Theoretically, there are many other ways to
decrease the payoff of the owners of the bank (e.g. banning them from the banking
business for life-time), but I concentrate on the pecuniary measures that have been used
by the supervisors until now. Proposition 2 allows to disregard downsizing. Given (2.2),
recapitalization cannot lead to taking away all the profits from the shareholders, hence
it has to be complemented with the fine. The fine has a different disciplining effect than
recapitalization. In the latter case the bank looses only the difference between the cost
of capital and deposits, δ − rD, on the additional equity financing. In the former case
the bank’s shareholders loose their wealth in the amount f and its opportunity cost δ.
Moreover, the fine has to be levied at the time of inspection, because a fine collected
after the returns have been realized does not harm the bank L, which goes bankrupt.
However, the fine cannot substitute fully recapitalization as a penalty. The reason is
that the fine does not eliminate the moral hazard problem as it has to be paid before
the bank decides whether it operates the project i or appropriates b.




pi [VH − q(1− γ)((δ − rD)x+ δf))− qm] + (1− pi)VL
s.t.:
rL − rD − (kH + x)(δ − rD)− f(1 + δ) ≥ b− (kH + x)(1 + δ)− f(1 + δ),
VL ≥ (1− qγ) [b− kH(1 + δ)] + qγ [rL − rD − (kH + x)(δ − rD)− f(1 + δ)] ,
rL − rD − (kH + x)(δ − rD)− f(1 + δ) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
The first constraint eliminates the moral hazard problem. The second constraint is the
truth-telling constraint of the bank L and the third is its participation constraint. I
assume here that parameters are such that the IC constraint for the bank H is satisfied
and the supervisor is not constrained in choice of q (analogue of Lemma 3 holds). The
program delivers the following optimal solution:
Lemma 9 The optimal supervisory scheme implementing the sensitive capital require-














, if m < (1− γ)rD∆k.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The optimal contract implementing the sensitive capital requirements is a combination
of recapitalization and fine.45 Recapitalization eliminates the moral hazard problem
and the fine is used to contain the misreporting incentives. Interestingly enough, the
participation constraint binds only if the cost of inspection is sufficiently high (m ≥
(1− γ)rD∆k).
2.8.2 Constrained supervisor
Sometimes the supervisor may be allowed to choose freely only q, given an exogenously
prescribed level of penalty. In such a case, it may happen that the penalty may be too
low to be incentive compatible for the bank L, even for q = 1. Blum (2007) suggests
that an increase in the capital requirement for the bank H could resolve this problem by
decreasing gains from misreporting and restoring incentives for truth-telling. However
45The contract is only constrained-efficient given the requirement that the set of penalties encompasses
only the ones observed in the reality.
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in my setup, it is not clear whether this measure should be better than the insensitive
capital requirements, which are optimal when the incentive compatibility of the sensi-
tive ones cannot be reached. Increasing the capital requirements for the bank H can
make the sensitive capital requirements viable again, but it still needs penalties that are
socially costly, making this solution not necessarily better than the insensitive capital
requirements.
2.8.3 No commitment case
Assumption that the supervisor is able to commit ex ante to a certain probability of
inspection may seem sometimes unrealistic. Moreover, ex ante commitment scheme is
ex post inefficient, because the bank L behaves prudently in equilibrium and the bank
H is punished. Lack of commitment to q requires that the supervisor chooses it after the
bank’s report. This induces a standard inspection game (see e.g. Khalil (1997)) which
may have an equilibrium in mixed strategies in inspection and misreporting of the bank
L. The no commitment case is tedious to analyze as there are cases in which equilibria in
pure strategies arise.46 However, the qualitative results remain unchanged. Furthermore,
in my setup no commitment always delivers lower social welfare than commitment. The
reason is that the bank L sometimes goes bankrupt as it misreports with a positive
probability, what does not occur in the commitment case.
2.8.4 Asset-specificity
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) argue that the outside investors may be inefficient users
of assets purchased from banks for the following reasons. First, the investors may be
unable to generate full returns because they lack expertise in the acquired assets. Second,
assets’ sales may suffer from ”fire-sale” discounts especially when many banks fall into
distress at the same time. Formally, both possibilities could be modelled by introducing a
discount λ > 0 on the net return earned by the investors purchasing the bank’s project.
This discount has two effects on welfare. On the one hand, social welfare decreases
because the value of the project i is lower. On the other hand, the supervisor can
decrease the scope of his intervention because λ > 0 makes downsizing more harmful
for the banks as p decreases. This latter effect makes downsizing more attractive as a
penalty relative to recapitalization. Indeed, one can prove the following Proposition.47
Lemma 10 If λ ∈ (rH − rL; rH − δ], the sensitive capital requirements with downsizing
as penalty yield strictly higher welfare than those with recapitalization. If λ ∈
46The note with the full analysis of this case can be obtained on request.
47The proof of this result is omitted as it follows the lines of the proof of the Proposition 2.
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[0; rH − rL), the opposite is true. If λ = rH − rL, both yield the same welfare.
The upper bound on λ, rH − δ, comes from the fact that selling of the project can be
used to reduce the bank’s size as long as p ≥ 0.48 Hence, sufficiently high λ makes
downsizing a viable solution for implementation of the sensitive capital requirements.
The question arises how relevant λ > 0 is in this model. James (1991) provides empirical
evidence for significant decrease in the value of sold assets during liquidations of failed
banks. However, my model considers the case of selling the assets by banks that are
allowed to continue. In reality, such banks have some time to sell their assets, hence
the fire-sale discounts may not be so severe and recapitalization may still be better than
downsizing. Moreover, during a severe distress when many banks have to sell their assets
simultaneously, λ may be so high that downsizing as a measure to recapitalize may not
be feasible at all (p < 0).
2.9 Conclusions
The paper has been concerned with the design of supervisory schemes under risk-based
capital requirements a` la Basel II, when bank’s risk and actions are its private infor-
mation. The supervisor punishes the bank, when the signal received during inspection
is different from the bank’s risk report. Conditions for viability of Basel II and several
policy implications have been derived.
The necessary condition to make the banks report their risk truthfully is high quality
of inspection. High cost of capital increases incentives for truthful risk reporting under
recapitalization and downsizing. This is surprising because the higher the cost of capital
is, the stronger banks’ incentives to understate their riskiness are. In the case of closure,
only this latter effect exists and incentives to reveal risk decrease with the cost of capital.
Moreover, asset sales to boost capital ratios lead to lower discipline than injections of
inside equity capital. The optimal way to support risk-based capital requirements is to
punish undercapitalized banks with recapitalization and a fine.
If closures and fines are not feasible, measures supporting Basel II should depend on the
current situation in the economy. The paper points out that capital requirements for
the low risk banks may increase in recessions, which means that they should move in a
manner similar to ”anti-cyclical”: Risk-sensitive in booms supported by recapitalization,
and risk-insensitive in downturns. This conclusion contrasts with proposals to reduce
the pro-cyclicality effect of Basel II and highlights complexity of issues arising due its
introduction. In consequence, reducing risk misreporting incentives and the pro-cyclical
impact of Basel II may not be possible at the same time. The recent 2007 subprime
48λ ≤ rH − δ guarantees that pH ≥ 0.
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crisis has shown that, both, risk misreporting and pro-cyclicality of credit supply, are
important factors undermining the stability of banks. This observation and the implica-
tions of the paper suggest that Basel II may fall short of its target, which is to increase
resilience of the banking systems.
Chapter 3
The Creditworthiness of the Poor.
A Model of the Grameen Bank
3.1 Introduction
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank he created in 1983 were awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2006. The Grameen Bank’s main activity consists on granting loans to
poor people in Bangladesh. Leaving aside the social implications of this activity, the
most striking feature of this bank is the unusually high reported repayment rate, 98%,
compared to that achieved in the US banking sector, 96%.1 Although this repayment
rate may be due to different accounting and reporting standards, the actual repayment
rate of micro-finance institutions, 92%, is high relative to other lending institutions in
Bangladesh, 75%.2
Many empirical and theoretical studies have focused on group liability as the main rea-
son for high repayment rates in microfinance programs. Borrowers from microfinance
programs have been usually organized in groups, whose members are liable for each
other’s default. Group liability has been argued to increase borrowers’ incentives to
screen, monitor and repay the loans, exploiting their knowledge about the local condi-
tions. It must be highlighted that, from a theoretical perspective, group liability also
introduces a free rider problem in the repayment of the loan. Overall, evidence concern-
ing the performance of group liability contracts is at best mixed.3 It is important to
note that, nowadays, the Grameen Bank and other microfinance institutions explicitly
rule out group liability.4
1Sources: www.grameen-info.org and www.fdic.com.
2Source: Household Survey of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.
3See Morduch (1999), Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), and Gine and Karlan (2006) for
a summary of the empirical evidence.
4As it is stated on Grameen Bank’s web page “there is no form of joint liability, i.e. group members
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Leaving aside group liability, our paper highlights a novel explanation for the high re-
payment rate of the microfinance programs. We build on the observation that borrowers
in these programs have one common characteristic: they are poor individuals living in
rural areas. This has two important implications: (i) current and future income of poor
individuals is low and (ii) as they live in rural areas, accessing savings technologies from
urban banks is not possible. A microfinance bank lending and taking deposits increases
the current income of the individuals by giving them the opportunity of undertaking
investment activities by borrowing, and also increases their future income as it provides
them with a savings technology that allows individuals to transfer part of their current
income to the future.
We argue that deposit taking is an important, and frequently overlooked, side of the
relationship between the microfinance bank and the poor individuals.5 In rural areas of
Bangladesh saving outside the banking sector has been argued to be not profitable due to
causes such as the high probability of natural disasters, inflation, and theft.6 We claim
that poorer individuals in the population are the ones that value more the opportunity
to increase their low future income by depositing their savings in the microfinance bank.
From here we conclude that poorer individuals must have higher repayment rates on their
loans in order to maintain their relationship with the microfinance bank and benefit from
the savings mechanism.
We propose a theoretical model with overlapping generations of individuals living for
three dates. Individuals receive a loan from the bank when they are young, and repaying
the loan allows them to access the savings technology offered by the bank and increase
their income when old. Our first theoretical result states that borrowers with worse
future prospects (henceforth low outside options) are those most likely to repay the loan
because accessing the savings technology is more valuable to them. Borrowers endowed
with better outside options are more prone to default, as saving is less valuable for them
and defaulting on the loan increases their current income.
Building on this result on borrowers’ repayment behavior, we study its implications in an
infinitely lived, risk neutral, monopolistic banking sector. We characterize the transition
to steady state of a financially constrained bank financing its lending only with deposits
taken from its borrowers and from retained earnings. During transition to steady state
the bank does not disburse any dividends and reinvests all the profits in increasing the
loan supply. Our results closely match the evidence that the Grameen Bank has not
to paid out dividends since its foundation, and are in line with the high growth it has
achieved. The first year in which the Grameen Bank paid dividends was 2006. At the
end of this year the Grameen Bank was present in more than 95% of all the villages in
are not responsible to pay on behalf of a defaulting member.“
5One exception is the empirical study by Kaboski and Townsend (2005).
6See Banerjee and Duflo (2006).
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Bangladesh.
Our second theoretical result highlights that a bank able to distinguish between bor-
rowers’ groups with different distributions of outside options obtains higher profits by
lending to groups whose distribution is worse. It is straightforward to reason that in the
context of our model the best performing borrowers, those with the worse distribution of
their outside options, would be individuals from rural areas, and more specifically women
from those rural areas. Individuals in rural areas of Bangladesh face a higher unemploy-
ment rate that those living in urban areas, and earn lower wages once they find a job.
Among the rural inhabitants, women are the ones who face the lowest wages and the
biggest difficulties in finding a job. The fact that currently 98% of all Grameen Bank’s
borrowers are women from rural areas supports our theoretical prediction regarding the
composition of the bank’s borrowers.
After stating our theoretical results we conduct an empirical analysis using data from
a quasi experimental survey jointly conducted by the World Bank and the Bangladesh
Institute of Development Studies during 1998 and 1999. In order to test our theoretical
result about the effect of borrowers’ future income prospects on the probability of loan
repayment, we use three proxies for the future prospects of the borrower: The borrower’s
gender, the average wage by gender in the village in which the borrower lives, and the
dowry received by the borrower’s family at the time of the borrower’s marriage.
First, we find evidence consistent with the idea that women repay more often than men.
We claim that the fact that women face higher unemployment rates and lower wages
than men drives this observation. Second, we find that the average wage by gender in the
village is positively and significantly correlated with the default probability. Moreover
we find that including this measure of expected income reduces the estimated gender
gap in loan repayment between female and male borrowers. This is consistent with our
claim that gender is a proxy of the economic conditions faced by the borrower. Finally,
we argue that dowry is a good exogenous proxy for the future prospects of a borrower
as higher dowries are positively associated with the wealth of the family.7 Consistent
with our theory, the amount of dowry is found to be positively and significantly related
to the probability of default, reflecting that individuals with better prospects are more
prone to default on their loans.
Next, we analyze the composition of borrowers by the different groups of lenders. We
find that the Grameen Bank and other microfinance institutions lend to a higher fraction
of women and to those individuals with lower levels of dowry than other lenders. This
backs our prediction that a bank that lends to individuals with poor prospects obtains
higher repayment rates. However, we do not find that microfinance institutions lend
in villages with lower average wages. We argue that microfinance institutions offer an
7See Anderson (2007) and references therein.
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option to poor individuals which increases their wages. Hence the observed wage in the
village increases when the microfinance institution is present.
Finally, we analyze the effect of the presence of competing banks on the probability of
default of a borrower. In our theoretical model increasing the number of banks allows
the individuals to access a profitable savings technology independently of defaulting on
their current loan. Hence, increasing the availability of banks increases the default rate
of borrowers. We find that borrowers that have access to other banks have, in fact, a
higher probability of default.
Our paper provides a novel reason for the success of the microfinance programs ab-
stracting from group liability issues and highlighting the deposit side of microfinance
programs. Moreover, empirical evidence supports our main theoretical results. Our
theoretical setup embeds the reasons of loan default in a dynamic equilibrium model
with overlapping generations of households that borrow and save, which is a novel ap-
proach in the literature on banking for the poor. Moreover, we analyze the dynamics of
a financially constrained bank in the context of microfinance lending.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 3.3 analyzes the equilibrium of the model. Section 3.4 presents the
theoretical results on the optimal composition of bank’s borrowers. Section 3.5 presents
the data that we use in our empirical analysis. Section 3.6 presents the empirical results.
Finally Section 3.7 concludes. The Appendix B contains proofs of the results and the
regression tables.
3.2 The Model
Consider a discrete time, infinite horizon economy where dates are denoted by t =
0, 1, 2... The economy consists of an infinitely lived agent called the banker and overlap-
ping generations of individuals living for three dates.
3.2.1 Individuals
At each date t, a continuum of measure N of penniless individuals are born. They all
have the same preferences for consumption at dates t + 1 and t + 2 described by the
function
u(ct+1) + δu(ct+2)
where u(c) satisfies u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) < 0, and δ < 1 is an intertemporal discount
factor.
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Each individual i is characterized by a parameter θi which is constant during the individ-
ual’s life and unobservable by third parties. The distribution of θ among the newborns
is described by a time invariant, continuous distribution function F (θ) with support
[θ, θ]. Let f(θ) = F ′(θ) denote the corresponding density function. Parameter θi should
be understood as individual i’s potential (labor or informal) income. To simplify the
presentation we assume u(θ) = −∞.
The date in which they are born, individuals have the possibility of investing in a project
that has a unit cost and yields a time invariant deterministic return 1+α at the following
date. In order to undertake the project, they require a unit loan from a bank at a (net)
loan rate l.
At date t, newborn individuals decide whether to borrow in order to undertake the
project or obtain their specific alternative income θi.
8 At date t + 1 individuals decide
whether to repay the loan and the amount of savings to deposit in the bank. At date
t + 2, individuals consume θi and the proceeds from savings if they have saved. Hence,
parameter θi captures two different types of income. At date t + 1, it captures the
potential income the individual could obtain from the labor market, so this can be
understood as the outside option of individual. At date t + 2, it mainly captures the
family care the individual expects to receive when old. Although θi could potentially be
different in both periods, it is reasonable to assume that it will be positively correlated.
Richer families give better opportunities to their young members and also provide better
family care when old. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that this correlation
is equal to one and, hence, θi is the same at dates t + 1 and t + 2. The model delivers
the same qualitative results if we assumed positive correlation between θi at both dates.
Henceforth, we will simply refer to θi as the outside option of individual i.
Defaulting on the loan increases the individual’s current income as her earnings are 1+α
instead of α − l. However, by defaulting the individual loses the opportunity to access
the savings technology offered by the bank and use it to increase her consumption when
old. The opportunity to save is lost because (i) the defaulting individual will not deposit
her savings in the bank in order to avoid their seizure, and (ii) saving other than through
bank deposits is not possible.9 Hence, when the individual does not repay the loan, her
income when old is equal to θi.
Formally, an individual with outside option θ does not default on the loan if the utility
8To lighten notation subindex i that identifies the borrower will be dropped when unnecesary.
9This assumption is supported by empirical findings in Banerjee and Duflo (2007). They note
that savings out of the banking system are not profitable in poor countries because of events such as
inflations, natural catastrophes and thefts by strangers or by (male) family members. Our model could
incorporate a cost of saving outside of the banking sector, 1 − λ. Parameter λ should be understood
as the probability of losing the savings when saving outside of the banking industry. For exposition
purposes we assume λ = 1. Appendix C presents a model with competing savings alternative.
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from repaying the loan and saving at a net deposit rate d, Ur(l, d, θ), is higher than the
utility from default, Un(θ). The utility of defaulting on the loan is
Un(θ) = u(1 + α) + δu(θ)
The utility from repaying the loan is obtained by solving the following program:
Ur(l, d, θ) = max
s≥0
[u(α− l − s) + δu(θ + s(1 + d))]
where s are borrowers’ savings invested in bank deposits. The first term of the objective
function is the utility from current consumption after the savings decision has been
made. The second term is the discounted utility from consuming θ and the proceeds
from savings tomorrow.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume that the gross return of the investment
project is smaller than the gross discount rate, 1 + α < 1/δ. Since in equilibrium the
deposit rate d, will not exceed the loan rate l, which in turn will not exceed the net return
of the project α, this implies 1+d < 1/δ. From here it follows that u′(θ) ≥ δ(1+d)u′(θ),
so individuals that do not borrow will not want to save. We also assume that the upper
bound of the support of the distribution satisfies θ ≤ 1 + α. This guarantees that all
individuals want to borrow from the bank because by doing so they can always get
Un(θ) = u(1 + α) + δu(θ), which is greater than u(θ) + δu(θ).
In Section 3.3 we show that there is a threshold θ̂(l, d) such that Un(θ) ≤ Ur(l, d, θ) for
all θ ≤ θ̂(l, d). In other words, poorer individuals, those with θ ≤ θ̂(l, d), are those who
repay the loan. Hence, the fraction of performing loans is given by F (θ̂(l, d)). Finally
let s(l, d, θ) denote the optimal savings of individuals with θ ≤ θ̂(l, d).
3.2.2 The banker
The banker is assumed to be risk neutral and has an initial wealth W < N, which
prevents him from lending to all individuals at the initial date t = 0. The banker




where β is the banker’s intertemporal discount factor and Ct are the bank’s dividend
payments at date t.
At date t = 0 the banker sets up a bank by providing initial capital with his wealth.
The bank supplies loans and offers interest bearing deposits to individuals. The bank
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operates in an economy with no other external sources of financing. Hence, it can finance
loans only with deposits and accumulated reserves.
At each date t, the bank sets a loan rate lt, and a deposit rate dt, issues loans in amount
Lt and collects deposits Dt. Loans are supplied to newborns and deposits are the total
amount of savings from those who were granted a loan at date t − 1 and repaid it at
date t. When setting loan and deposit rates the banker takes into account that both
variables affect the optimal decision of repayment and savings of its borrowers.10 The
banker also decides the amount of loans it grants at every date taking into account that,
by the cash flow constraint, granting an additional loan he reduces the amount of money
he is able to disburse as dividends.






subject to the following constraints





L0 ≤ W, (3.1)
Ct ≥ 0. (3.2)
The first constraint is the cash flow constraint. At any date t, dividend payouts Ct must
be equal to the proceeds from loan repayments, plus the new deposits that the bank
obtains, minus the deposit repayments the banker has to meet, and minus the new loans
that the bank grants.11
The second constraint defines bank’s deposits at every date as the optimal savings of
the individuals who repay the loans granted the previous date. Finally, the third and
fourth constraints state that at the initial date t = 0 the bank cannot grant more loans
than the banker’s initial wealth, and that at any given date t the banker cannot pay a
negative dividend.
10The characterization of how the optimal decision of individuals are affected by loan and deposit
rates is presented in Section 3.3.
11Recall that F (θ̂(lt−1,, dt) is the fraction of loans that do not default at date t.
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3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is defined as a sequence of loan and deposit rates, the
total loans at each date t that maximizes the discounted stream of dividends of the bank
given the optimal decisions of the individuals.
3.3.1 Individuals’ optimal decisions
Individuals when deciding if they default on the loan or not take into account the amount
of savings they deposit in the bank in the case of not defaulting. Hence in this subsection
we first characterize the amount of savings individuals would deposit in the bank if they
repay and, once we characterize the optimal savings decision in the case of not defaulting,
we analyze the decision of defaulting on the loan or not.
As previously described, optimal savings s(l, d, θ) result from the optimization problem
of those individuals that repay the loan
s(l, d, θ) = arg max
s≥0
[u(α− l − s) + δu(θ + s(1 + d))]
Optimal savings are implicitly defined by the following first order condition
u′(α− l − s) = δ(1 + d)u′(θ + s(1 + d)).
Let θs denote the level of θ for which optimal savings are 0, that is θs is the value of θ
for which u′(α− l) = δ(1 +d)u′(θ) holds. Using the implicit function theorem it is direct
to show that for individuals with θ < θs we have
∂s(l, d, θ)
∂θ
= − δ(1 + d)u
′′(θ + s(1 + d))
u′′(α− l − s) + δ(1 + d)2u′′(θ + s(1 + d)) < 0.
When θ decreases individuals increase their savings as savings are used to smooth lifetime
consumption and those individuals with lower θ have higher differences in their earnings.
Once we have determined the optimal savings decisions when individuals repay the loan,
we focus on determining the fraction of borrowers that repay the loan, which in turn
defines the amount of bank deposits.
Taking into account that an individual decides to default when the utility of repaying,
Ur(l, d, θ), is lower than the utility of defaulting on the loan, Un(θ), we obtain the
following result.
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Proposition 1 There exists a threshold, θ̂(l, d), for which the individuals with lower θ
repay the loan and the individuals with higher θ do not. Moreover, it holds that
θ̂(l, d) < θs.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 states that individuals with low future income θ, do not default on their
loans. This is because these individuals are the ones that value more an increase in their
future consumption. In order to achieve this they have to deposit their savings in the
bank, and if they do not repay the loan the bank will seize their deposits as a way to
have their loan repaid.12
When setting loan and deposit rates the bank takes into account how they affect the
repayment behavior of its borrowers. Comparative static results for the threshold that
determines the default rate, θ̂(l, d), are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The threshold θ̂(l, d), and consequently the fraction of non defaulting loans
in the economy F (θ̂(l, d)), is decreasing in the loan rate l, and increasing in the
deposit rate d.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 states that the individuals with higher θ start to repay their loans when the loan
rate decreases or the deposit rate increases. In such cases the profitability of repayment
increases making it more attractive for the individuals to pay back the loan. The bank
will take into account this effects when setting the equilibrium loan and deposit rates.
3.3.2 Bank’s optimal strategy
To derive the optimal strategy of the banker we rely on the existence of two commitment
devices. The first of them is that the banker is able to commit not to receive deposits
from those individuals that do not repay the loan. The second is that the banker repays
those deposits that have been deposited in the bank.
Concerning the first commitment, it can be argued that it is not optimal for the banker to
repay deposits from individuals that defaulted on their loan. The banker when receiving
deposits from those individuals, has the right not to repay them, as the individual has
a debt with the bank, and by doing so the banker increases his revenues. Hence, if the
12In the context of our model the only way an individual can only increase his future income by saving.
Another approach which yields the same qualitative results would be the assumption of infinetly lived
individuals who receive a loan whenever they do not default on their previous loan. This setup would
however complicate the solution for the bank optimal decision of loan and deposit rates.
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individual has not repaid the loan he would not deposit in the bank to avoid the seizure
of her deposits.
The second commitment device relies on the assumption that at any given date the
continuation value of the bank is higher than the amount of deposits it has to repay.
When a banker does not repay its deposits the borrowers will not deposit their savings in
the bank as they anticipate that in future dates the bank will do the same. This leads to
all individuals defaulting if the bank does not pay back the deposits, so continuing with
the bank will not be profitable.13 Hence, we assume that at any given date the banker
is better off by continuing with the bank than by defaulting on its deposits repayment
obligations.
The optimal strategy of the bank is defined by the amount of loans it grants at each
date as well as the loan rates and deposit rates it sets. The first decision concerns the
optimal amount of loans, which in turn defines the optimal dividend policy as the cash
flow constraint establishes that by granting an additional unit loan the banker decreases
his current dividend by one unit. It must be taken into account that, due to the banker’s
intertemporal discount factor, keeping cash without disbursing it in order to disburse it
in the future is not optimal. This results in all cash that is not used in granting new
loans being paid as dividends for the banker.
When the bank considers granting a loan to a newborn at date t it acknowledges that this
decreases the dividends at date t, but has two additional effects on future earnings. First,
at date t + 1 the bank has higher revenues from loan repayment as a higher number of
individuals obtained a loan. Second, as more individuals get loans the aggregate supply
of deposits at date t+1 is higher at the given rates, which has a negative impact at date
t+ 2 because the bank has to repay a higher amount of deposits.










Note that the value of expression (3.3) does not depend on the amount of loans granted,
and that the existence of the bank is conditional on it being positive. If (3.3) were
negative then the banker would refrain from investing any of its initial wealth in the
bank. Hence, as expression (3.3) is positive when the bank exists, then it is optimal for
the bank to increase the loan supply as long as it has the opportunity of granting a loan
13Note that if this condition does not hold the bank would not be established. Individuals would
anticipate bank behaviour and, by backwards induction, the result would be that individuals would
never deposit in the bank, which would make the bank not profitable in the initial date.
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to a newborn. This results in constraint (3.2) in the banker’s problem being binding
whenever Lt < N . Constraint (3.1) is also going to be binding, as initially the bank
cannot grant loans to all of the newborns (because W < N).
Once the bank grants loans to all of the young generationN, no further loan disbursement
is profitable as the bank can only grant additional loans to old individuals, who always
default as they have no incentives to repay. Hence, whenever the available funds once
bank’s deposits are repaid are higher than the amount needed for granting loans to the
new generation, (1 + lt−1)F (θ̂(lt−1, dt))Lt−1 + Dt − (1 + dt−1)Dt−1 > N, the bank will
grant N loans to the newborns and pay out the rest of the revenues as dividends.
We can summarize this discussion in the following result:
Proposition 2 As long as there are growth opportunities, Lt < N , dividends are equal
to 0. Once the growth opportunities are exhausted, Lt = N , dividends are positive.
Proposition 2 establishes that when growth opportunities are exhausted (steady state)
the bank is going to have positive cash flows, which it will pay out as dividends. These
dividends are defined by the following equation:
C = (1 + l∗)F (θ̂(l∗, d∗))N − (1 + d∗)D −N +D
where l∗ and d∗ are the equilibrium loan and deposit rates in steady state. In order to
determine the optimal dividends we solve the optimal loan and deposit rates the bank
sets at every date.





+ F (θ̂(lt, dt+1))
]
Lt + (1− β(1 + dt+1)) ∂Dt+1
∂lt
= 0. (3.4)
When setting lt the banker internalizes that increasing the loan rate decreases the repay-
ment rate of loans, the first term in square brackets, but also increases the payoffs from
those individuals which repay, the second term in square brackets. Moreover, increasing
the loan rate also affects the amount of deposits the bank obtains in the next period,
which it has to repay two periods after, the last term in equation (3.4).







Lt−1 + (1− β(1 + dt)) ∂Dt
∂dt
− βDt = 0 (3.5)
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When setting dt the bank internalizes that increasing the deposit rate increases the
repayment of loans granted at t − 1, which increases its revenues at date t, the first
term in equation (3.5). The bank also takes into account that increasing the deposit rate
affects the amount of deposits it receives at a given date and also the amount it has to
repay at the following date.
The first term in equation (3.5) highlights an interesting feature concerning the comple-
mentaries between loan and deposit rates in this model. As highlighted in Proposition
1, deposit rates have an incentivizing effect for the repayment of the current loans. This
matches the observed empirical finding that the Grameen Bank offers a higher deposit
rate to its borrowers than the rate offered by traditional banks in Bangladesh. The
Grameen Bank reports to pay 8.5% deposits to its borrowers when the average deposit
rate for deposits in the Bangladesh banking sector is 5%.14 According to our model,
the reason behind this fact is that the Grameen Bank obtains higher repayments using
deposit rates as an incetivizing device. We argue that traditional banks in Bangladesh,
as they operate in a more competitive environment (urban areas) in which individuals
are able to deposit savings in other banks, do not benefit from this effect and, hence,
set a lower deposit rate.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) establish that the optimal loan and deposit rates are constant
during bank’s lifetime and hence, independent of the dividend payout policy. Recall
that Dt = Lt−1
∫ θˆ(lt−1,dt)
θ
s(lt−1, dt, θ)f(θ)dθ and hence, equations (3.4) and (3.5) do not
depend on Lt and Lt−1 respectively. Hence, the bank solves the same system of two
equations with two unknowns at each date t. The main objective when jointly setting
lt and dt is to maximize the revenue of the bank independently of the final use of this
revenue. We can summarize this discussion in the following result
Proposition 3 Loan rates and deposit rates are constant during bank’s lifetime and,
hence, independent of the dividend payout policy.
The fact that loan and deposit rates are constant sets expression (3.3) to be constant,
which in turn results in an exponential growth of the bank. Recall that as long as
growth opportunities are present the bank invests all of the revenues in increasing the
loan supply.
This section has shown that a financially constrained profit maximizing bank will not
pay any dividends. This is important to be highlighted as precisely the non disbursement
of dividends has been argued to be evidence that the Grameen Bank was not a profit
maximizing agent. The conclusion that when profitable investment opportunities are
available dividends are equal to zero, closely matches the fact that the Grameen Bank
did not disburse dividends until 2006. From 1983, the year of its establishment, until 2006
14Sources: Central Bank of Bangladesh and Grameen Bank.
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the Grameen Bank has had an increasing presence in the rural villages of Bangladesh.
By the end of 2006, the Grameen Bank was present in over 95 % of the rural villages of
Bangladesh. Hence, it can be argued that at this point the Grameen Bank had covered
all of its objective market, and therefore exhausted all of the profitable investment
opportunities. In line with our theoretical prediction, at the end of 2006 the Grameen
Bank for the first time in its history paid dividends. Consistent with our predictions,
dividends were also disbursed at the end of 2007.
Another important issue that our theoretical model highlights is the reinforcement ef-
fect that the deposit rates have on loan repayment. When such an effect is taken into
account, the optimal deposit rate is higher which can account for the fact that the
Grameen Bank pays a higher deposit rate than other banks in Bangladesh. This rein-
forcement effect, added to the importance of deposits in a financially constrained bank,
highlights the importance of analyzing lending and borrowing decision at the same time
in a relationship banking setup.
3.4 Heterogenous distributions of outside options
Our previous analysis has assumed that the outside option θ of all individuals was drawn
from the same cumulative distribution function F (θ). It may be argued that in fact there
are different distributions of outside options among different types of individuals, for
example men and women, or landowners and landless. As we show in this section being
able to differentiate among type of individuals with different distributions of outside
options can be the key to bank’s survival, as only banks that focus on individuals with
lower expected income are going to be profitable. We also discuss the difference between
repayment rates and profitability when the bank grants loans and at the same time offers
deposits.
In this section we relax the assumption of a unique distribution function and assume that
there are two different distributions of outside options.15 We assume that a fraction γ of
individuals have their outside option drawn from a distribution F1 and a fraction 1− γ
from F2. We assume that F2 first-order-stochastically dominates F1, hence F1(θ) > F2(θ)
for all θ. This fact, together with the results from the previous section, gives the following
two Propositions.
Proposition 4 For given l and d a banker who focusses on individuals whose distribu-
tion of θ is first-order-stochastically dominated will have higher repayment rates.
Proof. See Appendix B.
15The qualitative results hold if we assume a higher number of distribution functions.
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At this point the difference between repayment rates and profits must be studied. Al-
though Proposition 4 establishes that repayment rates are higher for banks that grant
loans to individuals under F1 the profits per loan of the bank focussing on such indi-
viduals may not be higher. Let pi1(l, d) denote the the average profits per loan from
individuals of type F1. Using the exposition of Section 3.2 we can define pi1(l, d) as
pi1(l, d) = −1 + β
[
(1 + l)F1(θ̂(l, d)) + S1
]




s(l, d, θ)f1(θ)dθ are the average savings per unit of loan and f1 is the
density function of F1.
We have shown that the repayment rates, for given l and d, increase when the bank
focusses on individuals of type F1, which in turn increases the profits of the bank .
However, by focussing on such individuals, the deposits the bank has to repay also
increase, recall that poorer individuals save more. This effect may in turn decrease the
profits of the bank that focusses on individuals with worse outside option.16 Hence,
when analyzing the profitability of microfinance institutions the repayment rate is not
be the only variable to be taken into account. Attention should also be paid to the effect
that deposits have on the profits.
When deposits have a positive effect on the profits of the bank, it is obvious that focussing
on individuals of type F1 is optimal as repayment rates increase and also deposits in-
crease. However, when deposits decrease the profits of the bank, the bank should impose
a maximum amount of deposits per borrower equal to s(l, d, θˆ). This will not decrease his
repayment rates, as individuals with θ < θˆ will continue to repay their loan, this follows
immediately from the proof of Proposition 1, and it will decrease the amount of deposits
it obtains. When this measure is taken into account, it is direct to show that focussing
in individuals with worse distribution of outside options increases the profitability of the
bank.
Let l2, d2 denote the equilibrium loan and deposit rates that maximize pi2(l, d). By the
previous exposition, when deposits decrease the profits of the bank, the bank would
set a maximum deposit amount equal to s(l, d, θˆ(l2, d2)). From equation (3.6) a bank
focussing on distribution F1 and setting the same loan and deposit rates, and the same
maximum amount of deposits per individual will have higher profits. Note that his
repayment rate increases and the amount of deposits per individual S1, does not vary.
17
Hence we can conclude that by focussing on individuals with worse outside option the
banker will increase his profits.
From the previous discussion we can conclude that the ability of distinguishing between
16This occurs when in equilibrium β(1 + d) > 1.
17Also it must be take into account that the banker can always set the deposit rate to be 0 and not
lose in deposits.
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different types of individuals plays a crucial role in the existence of a bank. When F1
and F2 are not observable by the banker, the banker faces a distribution
Fm(θ) = γF1(θ) + (1− γ)F2(θ).
Following the previous exposition, there may be cases in which a banker that focusses on
F1 has positive profits but the banker focussing on Fm has negative profits. In this cases
the banker able to distinguish between F1(θ) and F2(θ) will set up a bank and lend only
to individuals whose θ comes from F1(θ). The banker who observes only Fm(θ) would
not find profitable to set up a bank. This can be an important issue when establishing a
microfinance program. For the microfinance program to be profitable, the banker must
have the ability of distinguishing those individuals with worse outside options. The
banker with such ability will focus on individuals with low outside options and by doing
so increase the profits of his bank.
3.5 Data description
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data from a quasi experimental survey con-
ducted jointly by the World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.
The survey’s main purpose is to provide data for analyzing three microfinance programs
in Bangladesh: the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee,
and the Rural Development-12 program of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board.
We analyze the information from the 1998-1999 wave containing information on 15,553
individuals from 2,599 randomly chosen households. These households come from 96
villages of 32 thanas.18 A detailed description of the survey can be found in Khandker
(1998). The main characteristic that must be highlighted is that it is a cross section,
and hence, we cannot apply panel data techniques to our data.
The survey contains details on personal and financial characteristics of the individuals in
the surveyed households, as well as on the social and economic characteristics of villages
in which these households live. For the purpose of our empirical analysis we mainly focus
on those households which report taking loans. From the total number of 7,396 loans
in the sample, we are able to use information regarding 6,385 loans. The main reason
for this reduction is lack of information on the date of maturity of these loans, which
precludes qualifying the loan as defaulted or not. We classify a loan as defaulted when
one of the following conditions holds: (i) the borrower reported a reason for default, or
(ii) the loan has not been repaid in full 3 months after the due date.19 According to this
18Thana is an administrative unit consisting of several villages.
19The standard period after which the loan is classified as defaulted is 3 months. Our results are
robust to changes in the number of months that classifies a loan as defaulted.
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definition, we classify 768 loans as defaulted in our sample. We conduct our analysis
with a base number of 6,385 observations, which vary depending on the control variables
we use.
For the loans in our analysis, we have detailed information on the features of these loans,
e.g. amount given and repaid, loan rate, dates when they were taken, due and repaid, the
lender type, as well as on the personal and financial characteristics of the borrowers, like
age, education, gender, number of people providing income in the household, income and
savings. It must be taken into account that reported loans were taken in years ranging
from 1993 to 1999. Personal characteristics of the borrowers (except of age) are available
only for loans taken in 1997 and later, as the survey was conducted in 1998 and 1999,
and only information regarding the 12 months preceding the survey was obtained. This
reduces the sample when introducing personal characteristics in our regressions.
3.6 Empirical evidence
This section provides empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 1, which states that
borrowers with lower outside options are more creditworthy, and Proposition 4, which
states that banks focussing on individuals with lower outside options exhibit higher
repayment rates.
3.6.1 Higher outside options result in higher defaults
In this subsection, we present evidence on the importance of outside options in deter-
mining loan repayment. Using a logit model with robust standard errors we estimate
the impact of three proxies of borrowers’ outside options on the probability of default.
As proxies of outside options we use the borrower’s gender, the average wage in the bor-
rower’s village by gender, and the amount of dowry received by the borrower’s family at
the time of the borrower’s marriage.
When indicated we control in our regressions for the following variables: borrower’s
age and education, the borrower’s and other household members’ income, the ratio of
household members without income to those providing it (called the dependency ratio),
the number of children the borrower has and the source of loan. The full description of
the variables is in Appendix A. The descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
Gender and expected wages
We claim that in Bangladesh the borrower’s gender is a strong predictor of an individual’s
outside option. Being born a woman in rural areas of Bangladesh results in lower
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wages and lower chances of finding employment.20 This allows us to conclude that
the borrower’s gender is a good proxy of the outside option in our model of loan default.
We construct a dummy variable taking value 1 for female borrowers. Consistent with
our theory we expect female borrowers to have lower probabilities of default.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the estimates of the logit regression of default on the
borrower’s gender. As expected, the gender’s coefficient is negative and significant.
This finding is in line with the majority of studies on microfinance stating that female
borrowers are more creditworthy.21 Although several studies have documented this result
before, these studies lack an economic explanation for the underlying causes of this
effect. Various studies have stressed intrinsic characteristics of women, such as being
more risk averse than men. In contrast, we argue that different economic conditions lead
to different repayment behavior by female borrowers. More specifically, lower outside
options imply higher repayment rates.
In order to better assess the importance of gender, we provide in column (2) of Table 2
estimates from a regression with an extended set of control variables. In this case our
sample is reduced to 3,790 observations, mainly because we are able to use only those
loans for which we have the data on the controls, i.e. only for loans taken from 1997
onwards. The set of control variables includes the borrower’s age, education, her/his
income and of other members of her/his household, the dependency ratio and her/his
number of children.
The impact of gender is still negative and significant reflecting, according to our proposed
interpretation, the effect of women’s lower outside options. Borrower’s education, which
can be regarded as a proxy for skills, also has a positive and significant impact on the
default probability. The income generated by the borrower and by the other members
of the borrower’s household as well as the dependency ratio are meant to control for
individual and household exposure to specific shocks such as natural catastrophes or
medical needs. The coefficients on income variables are not significant. The coefficient
on the dependency ratio is positive and significant, reflecting that higher fraction of
members not generating income makes the borrower more vulnerable to negative shocks
such as a medical expenditure and more likely to default. Finally, we also introduce the
number of children as a control variable, although it is not significant.
As we have previously argued, women have lower wages than men in rural Bangladesh,
and this can be one important factor explaining the gender gap in loan repayment. To
further address this issue, we create a variable which is the average wage that the indi-
20Table 1 shows that the average female wage is smaller than the average male wage. We do not
have data on the unemployment rate in each village needed to compute the expected wage. Statistics
from the World Bank state that female unemployment in rural Bangladesh is 50% higher than male
unemployment.
21See Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for a survey of this literature.
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viduals receive in each village by gender. This measure is a proxy for the expected wage
of the borrower and by construction it is no longer borrower specific as all borrowers of
the same gender who live in the same village are imputed the same wage. All individuals
surveyed, independently of having borrowed or not, report the wages they earned while
working as employees in the non-agricultural sector. By averaging these wages by gender
in each village we construct a proxy for the outside option of the borrower.
Column (3) in Table 2 reports the results of the regression of default on the average wages
in the village while preserving the gender dummy. It shows that for both men and women
the coefficient on the average wage is positive and significant, which is in line with our
Proposition 1. The following regression reported in column (4) confirms the previous
results when we add the controls used in previous regressions. In this regression the
education loses its positive and significant sign. It may well be that education proxies,
at least to some extent, for the effect of wages. It is reasonable to assume that villages
with high wages will also have more education, as wages and education are known to be
positively correlated.
As we have just shown, introducing economic factors such as borrower’s expected wage
in the village helps to explain the gender gap in loan repayment. This is consistent with
our explanation of gender being a proxy for the outside option of the borrowers, and
differs from other informal explanations in the literature.
Dowry
In order to better assess the importance of borrowers’ outside options for their repayment
behavior we use the dowry exchanged in the marriage. The literature concerning dowry
has documented that wealthier families pay higher dowries and that the dowry received
by the borrower’s family increases with her/his expected income.22 In the context of our
model, coming from a wealthier family would increase the outside option of the borrower
as wealthier families are able to provide better prospects for their relatives. This ranges
from offering better labor opportunities to providing monetary and in kind transfers in
case of need.
Our dowry variable is constructed in such a way that both spouses in the marriage have
the same imputed dowry. Hence, it is not going to be suitable to explain the gender gap.
However, it is suitable to test Proposition 1 regarding the importance of the outside
options in loan repayment behavior.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimates from a regression of default on dowry. The
sample is reduced to 5421 loans as only for this number of loans we have reports on the
amount of dowry exchanged. It must also be taken into account that not all borrowers
22See Anderson (2007) for a survey of the literature.
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are married. In this regression we also include the gender dummy. The coefficient on
the dowry is positive and significant. As reported in column (2) of Table 3 this result is
robust to including the controls used in the previous regressions.
As we have previously argued, dowry can be interpreted as a measure of the expected
future income of the individuals. Following such reasoning the current income of the
individuals can be instrumented by dowry in order to control for unobservable shocks
that are related to current income and default, like robbery and natural catastrophes.
In such case dowry would capture the part of the individuals income which is not af-
fected by the shocks, which can be seen as the expected outside option of the borrower.
Column (3) shows the result of a probit estimation in which the variable income has
been instrumented by the dowry exchanged by the individuals.23 The results of such
estimations is that higher income, once instrumented, leads to higher default.
Robustness check concerning dowry
One concern while using dowry as a proxy for outside options is the high percentage of
reports of no dowry being received. Marriages reporting no dowry received account for
around 50% of the sample. In order to control for different explanations why no dowry
was given, such as being extremely poor and not being able to raise money for dowry
or having different marriage traditions, we run our regression on a constrained sample
of borrowers reporting a positive dowry. Column (4) in Table 3 shows the results of this
robustness check. It can be seen that restricting our sample only to individuals with
positive dowry does not change our results.
Another concern regarding the dowry is the possible existence of misbehavior by the
borrowers receiving dowry. Dowry exchange is illegal in Bangladesh meaning that a
person engaging in such a practice may be also prone to commit other illegal acts which
may positively correlate with default, including strategic defaults. In order to test this
explanation we generate a dummy reflecting whether dowry was actually exchanged.
This dummy proxies for the possibility that the individual may be prone to other misbe-
havior. We run a regression of default with the usual controls and including the dowry
dummy. Results are reported in column (5). The coefficient on the dowry dummy is
insignificant, meaning that the effect of dowry is related to the levels of the variable and
not to the existence or not of dowry. This allows us to conclude that the channel through
which dowry affects repayment rates is related to the outside options of the borrowers.
Although dowry exchange is nowadays illegal in Bangladesh, we do not expect to have
a mismeasurement of the variable dowry. As the survey was not conducted by organi-
23Due to programming difficulties we could not conduct a logit estimation with instrumental variables.
It must be highlighted that results of probit estimations do not have quantitative impact on the value
of our regressors.
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zations capable of punishing the individuals, the incentives to lie are not clear. One of
the main effects of having misreporting of dowry is that it would bias the coefficient of
dowry towards 0, making it more difficult to find positive effects. The biggest concern
would be that only individuals with high levels of dowry reported low levels of dowry
and those with intermediate levels did not misreport. We argue that this is not the
case in our sample as individuals have the same incentives to misreport independently
of their dowry, and hence, we should not have non monotonicities in the misreporting.
As we use the dowry mostly as a ranking mechanism the important assumption is that
if misreporting of dowry exists in the survey, this does not affect the ranking. Hence,
if misreporting exists, we assume that on average individuals with higher dowry have
higher reported dowry.
All proxies
In the last column of Table 3 we report the estimates of a regression including all proxies
for outside options and all controls. All coefficients used as proxies of outside options
preserve their signs. The most important result of that regression is that the impact
of the gender dummy is strongly reduced and it looses its significance. The loss in
significance backs further our result that being a female borrower translates into low
outside options. This supports Proposition 1 and goes against the informal explanations
addressing the gender gap in repayment behavior. The loss of significance is in line with
a claim posed by Armendariz and Murdoch (2005) who argue that having controlled for
sufficient amount of borrowers’ characteristics, gender will not matter for the repayment
behavior of the borrowers.
3.6.2 Borrowers’ composition depends on institutions
Next, we focus on empirical evidence consistent with section 3.4. In order to support
this result we conduct a test of difference in means concerning the percentage of female
borrowers, the level of dowry of the borrowers and the expected wages by gender in
the village. We also test if microfinance institutions have a lower fraction of defaulting
loans.
Table 4 shows that, as predicted by our model, we find that the Grameen Bank exhibits
higher repayment rates and focuses on borrowers with lower outside options. The mi-
crofinance institutions have a statistically significant higher amount of female borrowers
and the average dowry exchanged by a borrower in the microfinance institution is lower
than for the other lenders. Concerning the expected wage in the village, we see that the
microfinance institutions do not focus on villages with lower wages. This however may
a result of the lending practices of the microfinance institutions. By lending in those
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villages the supply of cheap labor is reduced and the equilibrium wage of the village is
increased.
Controlling for the lender type
It can be argued that, due to the different selection procedure followed by the institu-
tions, our previous proxies for the outside options of the borrower were in fact proxies
for the lender type, mainly those regarding female and dowry. The problem of selection
in the microfinance programs has been previously treated in the microfinance literature
by authors such as Khandker.24 In order to test whether our results are stable after
controlling for the lender type, we introduce a dummy indicating the type of the lender.
There are several sources of lending indicated in the sample and we pool them into six
groups, which indicate the common features of these lenders. These groups are microfi-
nance institutions, relatives, moneylenders, cooperatives of credit, traditional banks and
non governmental agencies. Table 5 presents estimates of four regressions: for each of
the measures of outside options alone and one that contains all of them. We conclude
that our results do not change. In all regressions the gender coefficient becomes small in
absolute value (and looses significancy in all but one regression), which can be attributed
to the fact that the majority of borrowers of microfinance institutions are women.
In order to assess the importance of all of our regressions only for the Grameen Bank bor-
rowers we report the results of our estimations when only the borrowers of the Grameen
Bank are taken into account. Table 6 shows how the qualitative results remain un-
changed. Interestingly, the signs of age and education do change because when individ-
uals become older they receive a higher loan and also they receive education. Hence,
these variables can be seen as predictors of being a previous Grameen Bank borrower
and not having defaulted on the loan before. In order to study this point, we include the
size of the loan, which increases with the years of membership and previous repayment
behavior, and we see how these coefficients loose significance. Results of including the
loan amount are shown in column (3) of Table 6
3.6.3 The impact of competition
The theoretical predictions about the repayment behavior in our model are based on the
sole existence of a monopolistic bank. The enforcement mechanism which guarantees
loan repayment relies on the existence of one unique source of profitable saving technol-
ogy. In our model the inclusion of a second bank offering a savings technology results in
a lower repayment rate of the original bank.25 Individuals would default on the loan and
24See Khandker and Pitt (1998).
25For a theoretical model that supports this claim see the Appendix C.
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deposit their savings in the other bank. Hence, our model predicts that in the case of
the microfinance industry when additional channels of profitable savings are available,
the repayment rate decreases.
Empirically the effect of bank competition on the repayment behavior of individuals can
be tested by generating an indicator of the availability of profitable saving technologies
in a given village. In order to proxy for the availability of another bank, we construct
a dummy that takes the value 1 if any individual in the village took a loan from a
traditional bank. Implicitly we are assuming that traditional banks offer deposits at
a competitive rate to all individuals that are willing to deposit their savings in the
bank. This allows us to proxy for villages that have access to other sources of saving
technology than those of the microfinance institutions. Our model predicts villages with
other sources of profitable saving technology should have higher default rates than those
with out such options.
Consistent with our theory we find how living in villages with accessibility to bank
services has a positive and significant effect on the probability of failure of the individuals.
These results are reported on Table 7.
3.6.4 Further tests
Our theoretical setup has other testable implications that can be tested in the data. To
test these implications we conduct difference in means tests for such cases. Results of
this tests are reported in Table 8.
One empirical prediction of our model is that individuals who default would have lower
savings as they will not deposit their savings in the bank to avoid seizure. This pattern
is observed in the data as those individuals that default have on average lower savings
than those who do not. Our model also predicts that defaulting borrowers have higher
income in the date they default. This is an important feature which distinguishes our
theoretical model of strategic default from competing explanations. If defaults were
only due to exogenous shocks, we would expect borrowers receiving a negative shock,
i.e. disease or bad climate, would default but also have low income. In our model, those
that default strategically have higher income than those that do not default.
The empirical finding concerning the income of defaulting borrowers supports our model,
as the income of those who default is on average higher than of those that repay. The
data shows that borrowers that committed default in years before 1998 (the year when
the survey was conducted) have higher income in the years after their default (1998 or
1999) than those who do not default. This is in line with our theoretical setup as we
show that borrowers with better outside options in the following years are more prone
to default.
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Consistent with our theory, and previous theories regarding borrowing and lending be-
havior, when individuals have options of depositing their savings, or receiving new credit,
from other institutions defaulting on the loan affects less their future income. We find
how among individuals that default, those who have access to alternative banks have
higher income than those who do not have such options.
Also consistent with such theories when an individual does not default on the loan from
the microfinance institution, the existence of other sources of credit does not affect its
income as it continues to use the original source.
Regarding savings we find that those individuals that receive a loan by microfinance
institutions have higher average savings than those who do not, this is also consistent
with our theory as microfinance institutions have higher deposit rates and also focus
on those who have higher needs of savings. Also we find how the savings profile of the
individuals follows the pattern predicted by our model. Young individuals accumulate
savings that are used when they are old. This prediction is not new, as numerous studies
studying the life cycle profile of savings predict such pattern.
Another important result is that those individuals that are members of a microfinance
program generally save inside such a program. In our sample 70% of those that are
members have all their savings inside the program. It is interesting to note how, when
other banks are available, the amount of savings of the microfinance programs’ members
out of the program increases. Moreover, individuals who did not repay their loans have
a higher amount of their savings out of the microfinance programs. In addition, those
that do not save at all inside the microfinance program possess high savings too. Such
individuals can be characterized as being rich with better options of savings inside the
traditional banking system.
3.7 Conclusions
Microfinance programs achieve high repayment rates although their borrowers are ex-
tremely poor and do not provide collateral. Recent studies have stressed that group lia-
bility, which has been the most common explanation for this observation, does not have
an impact on microfinance repayment rates. Our paper provides a simple and tractable
model of borrowers with different expected labor or informal income, henceforth outside
option, and a monopolistic bank facing asymmetric information. We identify the optimal
default strategy for borrowers and the optimal lending and deposit taking strategy for
the bank. Then, we exploit theoretical predictions from our model to design empirical
tests addressing two hypotheses: (i) does the probability of default increases with the
borrowers’ outside option? and (ii) do lenders with higher repayment rates focus on
individuals with worse outside options? We test these hypotheses using the data from a
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quasi experimental survey from Bangladesh.
From a theoretical perspective we show how in a dynamic model in which the bank
takes deposits and grants loans to the same set of individuals, the deposit rate plays a
crucial role in enhancing loan repayment. Borrowers that repay are those with lower
expected future income as they value more the increase in future consumption that
savings provide. Hence, higher deposit rates increase the profitability of the savings
mechanism which increases the incentives for the borrowers to repay, as in the case of
defaulting they will not have access to bank’s deposits.
Empirically we find that those individuals with worse outside options are in fact those
with higher repayment rates. We use three proxies of the outside options of individuals
that are borrower’s gender, the average wage by gender in the village, and the dowry
exchanged in the borrower’s wedding. We also find that, consistent with our theoreti-
cal model, microfinance institutions focus on borrowers with lower outside options and
obtain higher repayment rates.
Our paper provides interesting policy implications. When designing a sustainable mi-
crofinance program the policy maker should be able to identify and focus on those
individuals with worse outside options, which in turn are poorer individuals. By doing
so the microfinance institution will obtain higher repayment rates which is crucial in ob-
taining a sustainable institution. However, depending on the equilibrium deposit rate,
the microfinance institution may need to establish a maximum amount of deposits per
borrower in order to increase his profits without decreasing his repayment rates
The placement of the microfinance program should take into account the existence of
alternative institutions that provide credit and savings to the individuals as we show
how such presence reduces the repayment rate of the individuals. This highlights the
risks that the expansion of microfinance may have on their profitability. Introducing
microfinance programs in places where other institutions already offer credit and deposits
will probably result in low repayment rates, and hence unsustainability, not only for the
incumbent but also for the institution that was present before.
Chapter 4
Endogenizing the Scope of the
Stigma of Failure
4.1 Introduction
Imperfect traceability of the reasons for business failures attaches a “stigma of failure” to
bankrupt entrepreneurs. When trying a fresh start, they are often left discriminated by
business partners, employees, and in particular investors. Despite extensive research, it
still remains unclear why the extent of this discrimination varies across countries, sectors
and over time. European and Japanese financiers, for instance, are perceived to be more
reluctant to finance a failed entrepreneur’s restart than their American counterparts. It
therefore became commonplace to praise the US’ lower “stigma of failure” as the source
of its higher entrepreneurship rates1 and consequently of its competitive edge in terms
of the ability to innovate, commercialize and grow.2
In this paper, we study to what extent different scopes of the “stigma of failure” (cap-
tured by the maximal number of times a failed entrepreneur is able to get fresh start
financing) can simultaneously be equilibrium outcomes. Our main result is that as soon
as the riskiness of failed projects cannot be evaluated by investors, two types of equilib-
ria may coexist: a conservative equilibrium, where a once-failed entrepreneur is excluded
from further finance, or experimental equilibria, where she can start projects even after
a (limited and endogenously determined) number of failures.
In our model, a wealthless entrepreneur seeks funding from a competitive banking sector3
in order to launch a project. This project can be run with high or low risk of failure. Its
1GEM (2008) reports that in 2007, 10.8% of adults were engaged in early-stage entrepreneurship in
the US as compared to only 5.4% in the EU or 5.4% in Japan.
2See Bottazzi et al. (2003), EU Commission (2000), SME Agency (1999) or Wennekers et al. (2006).
3The results can also be applied to alternative forms of entrepreneural finance.
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probability of success does not only depend on this risk, but also on the entrepreneur’s
inherent skills4, which can be high or low. Unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), neither
the entrepreneur nor banks know her skills. Only the distribution of skills is publicly
known. If the project is successful, the entrepreneur continues her business, payoffs are
realized and the game is over. If the project fails, the bank that financed the project
loses its investment and the entrepreneur asks for further entrepreneurial finance in order
to start a new project in the next period. The structure of the game is the same in each
period. However, after each failure, banks update their belief about the probability
whether the entrepreneur has high skills or not. This belief is not only dependent on
the initial distribution of skills, but also on the level of risk, which has been chosen in
the preceding periods: if this risk has been high (low), the belief about the probability
that the entrepreneur has high skills is also relatively high (low).
Different scopes of the “stigma of failure” can occur in equilibrium only if the en-
trepreneur can trade off the expected return of a project against its maximal return:
therefore we assume that a low-risk project has a higher expected return, while the re-
turn from the high-risk project in case of success exceeds the return from the low-risk
project. We show that if the risk of failure of the high-risk project is not too high and the
probability of having high skills is sufficiently close to unity, then the first-best outcome
is as follows: the entrepreneur realizes high-risk projects in the first periods and then
(if all these projects were unsuccessful) switches to the low-risk project. Finally, if she
also fails with the low-risk project, she stops realizing projects as it becomes relatively
certain that she has low skills.
We will analyze three informational settings: (I.) Under perfect information, banks can
observe both the entrepreneur’s past and present risk choices, i.e. there is no moral
hazard. We show that any sequential equilibrium is efficient in this setting. (II.) Under
private information of banks, these can only assess the riskiness of projects financed
by themselves. Conservative and experimental equilibria can then simultaneously exist
and be sequential equilibria. This is due to the fact that not all banks can observe the
entrepreneur’s decisions. A bank may then become a monopolistic supplier of finance to
the entrepreneur if all of its competitors believe that the entrepreneur’s skills are low.
The credit market outcome might be inefficient, as the entrepreneur chooses the low-
risk project too early. (III.) Finally, the same result obtains under moral hazard, where
banks can neither observe the riskiness of past, nor present projects: if banks believe
that the entrepreneur chooses high (low) risk, they charge a high (low) loan rate, which
makes the entrepreneur choose the high (low) risk. There is, however, one exception:
there may also arise a situation, in which a conservative equilibrium is more efficient
than any experimental equilibrium.
4For example, entrepreneural skills can represent whether the ideas of an entrepreneur have a high
or low probability of success.
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We provide a novel explanation on why economies with identical cultural and institu-
tional constraints can suffer from different scopes of the “stigma of failure”. Our results
lead to a number of policy implications. A banks’ ability to observe both past and
present risk choices of entrepreneurs proves crucial in preventing credit market ineffi-
ciencies. This supports the view that an efficient system of entrepreneurial finance may
be based on small banks or venture capital firms who know their clients’ business well.
We argue that most of the EU’s envisaged policies to reduce the “stigma of failure” might
not be effective, since the expectations and actions of many market participants must be
changed simultaneously. Likewise, potential gains from an increase in entrepreneurial
skills in the population might not fully be realized unless the risk of both past and
present projects can be evaluated by investors.
Related Literature Varying levels of the “stigma of failure” have typically been
attributed to either persistent cultural or institutional differences between countries.
There is nevertheless still widespread dispute about which and how cultural traits might
shape attitudes towards entrepreneurial failure.5 Burchell and Hughes (2006) obtain
that GDP growth is not related to failure tolerance, but positively to society’s positivity
towards second chancing. Yet, as respondents in the US show higher levels of failure
tolerance but less willingness to grant a second chance to failed entrepreneurs than
Europeans, more entrepreneurial activity in the US cannot be attributed to a more
favorable cultural perception of second chancing. Institutional constraints show limited
impact on agents’ decision to start new firms. This suggests the experience of the EU-15,
where entrepreneurial activity remained quite stable - even after firm setup costs had
declined by a third between 2002 and 2007 (see EurActiv 2007).
We focus instead on capital market constraints, which we endogenize. The closest pa-
per to ours is Landier (2006). In his model, high-skill entrepreneurs liquidate mediocre
projects in the experimental equilibrium despite their positive net present values. In
the conservative equilibrium, entrepreneurs maintain mediocre projects and therefore
only low-skill entrepreneurs start a second-time business, which then increases the loan
rate. Landier thus rather scrutinizes the liquidation decision and not, like our paper,
second chancing after bankruptcy. Groom and Scharfstein (2002) study an organiza-
tional choice model with labor market rigidities as barriers to entrepreneurship. When
managerial incentives depend on the career prospects, agents might prefer dependent-
to self-employment. Due to asymmetric information, financing capital is then shifted to
lower quality and younger firms. Our key driver, in contrast, is the interplay between
the entrepreneur’s skills and risk choices. Finally, the setting with private information
of banks builds on Petersen and Rajan (1995), Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004).
They show that long-term bank-firm relationships enable banks to gather valuable costly
5See e.g. Licht and Siegel (2006), Hayton et al. (2002) or Giannetti and Simonov (2004).
66 CHAPTER 4. STIGMA OF FAILURE
information on their customers. That overrides bank competition for older customers,
so that banks can capture some of their rents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model and derives the first-
best outcome. In Sections 4.3 to 4.5 we analyze credit market equilibria for different
informational settings: perfect information, private information of banks and imperfect
information. After having studied welfare and policy implications in Section 4.5, Section
4.6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix C.
4.2 The model
We consider an economy populated by an entrepreneur E and N > 1 banks Bk, k ∈
{1, ..., N}.6 Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. All players are risk-neutral.
4.2.1 The Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur is endowed with entrepreneurial skills θi which are either high (i = H)
or low (i = L), but with no wealth on her own. The level of skills i is time-invariant
and unobservable to her and banks. However, both E and banks know that the ex-ante
probability of high skills is equal to α1 ∈ (0, 1). In period 1, E has access to a project of
size 1, which she can realize or not. If E does not realize the project or she does not get
a loan, the game is over an the payoff is 0 for all players. Otherwise, E chooses a risk
of failure pj of either high (j = H) or low (j = L) value. The project’s return structure
yij is determined by E’s level of skills i and choice of risk j:
yij =
{
yj, with probability (1− pj)θi
0, with probability 1− (1− pj)θi
Thereby, yj is the risk-dependent project return in case of success and (1 − pj)θi the
probability of success when E’s skill is i ∈ {L,H} and her risk choice is j ∈ {L,H}.
In order to simplify matters, we set pL = 0 and θH = 1. If E’s project with risk of
failure j is successful, she exits the game and her payoff is equal to yj minus the loan
rate for this project.7 As E has no own wealth, this payoff cannot be negative: if the
loan rate is higher than the project return, her payoff is equal to 0 and the bank gets the
project return. If E’s project is not successful, she does not pay anything to the bank
that granted the loan and moves on to the next period. The structure of the game is the
6The results carry over easily to a continuum of entrepreneurs.
7This assumption embodies that E continues her successful business (with yj , j ∈ {L,H}, being the
net present value of certain future payoff streams), and therefore does not need to ask for entrepreneural
finance another time.
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same in each period. Thus, E asks for finance in period t only if she realized t− 1 times
a project that failed. As tie-breaking rule we assume that E chooses j = L whenever
she is indifferent between the high- and the low-risk project.
In period 1, E has a belief α˜E1 = α1 about the probability that she has high skills. She
updates this belief according to Bayes’ rule. If she chooses the risk of failure j in period
t and the project fails, then her belief is given by
α˜Et+1(α˜
E
t , j) =
α˜Et pj
1− (1− pj)(α˜Et + θL − α˜Et θL)
. (4.1)
Her expected level of skills in a period t is given by
θ˜Et = α˜
E
t + (1− α˜Et )θL. (4.2)
4.2.2 Banks
Banks compete in a Bertrand manner by offering loan contracts to E. A contract only
specifies the loan rate E has to pay in case of success. They also may decide not to offer
any loans, however, we will assume that banks offer contracts as long as they can make
zero-profits in expectation. We will consider three informational settings:
(I.) Perfect information (PI): banks can observe the riskiness of both E’s past and
present projects.
(II.) Private information of banks (PRB): each bank can only observe the riskiness of
past and present projects it financed itself.
(III.) Imperfect information (IM): banks cannot observe any project’s riskiness.
Each bank Bk has a belief α˜
Bk
t about the probability that E has high skills if she
asks for project financing in period t. The way this belief is formed depends on the
informational setting: under (PI), banks observe all of the E’s past decisions, therefore
they can update their belief using Bayes’ rule like E does in (4.1). Under (PRB), a
bank k can update its belief from α˜Bkt to α˜
Bk
t+1 according to Bayes’ rule only if it financed
the project in period t. Otherwise, α˜Bkt+1 is given exogenously. Under (IM), the belief of
each bank in each period is given exogenously. Denote the expected level of skills in a
period t for Bk by
θ˜Bkt = α˜
Bk
t + (1− α˜Bkt )θL.
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Under (PI) and (PRB), Bk can condition its loan rate r
k
t both on its belief α˜
Bk
t and on
the risk of failure of the present project, i.e. there is no moral hazard. Thus, it offers
two contracts with loan rates rkt (α˜
Bk




t , L). Under (IM), a bank cannot
condition on the risk of failure of the project, therefore it offers only one loan rate
rkt (α˜
Bk
t ). We assume that banks cannot commit to certain loan rates in future periods.
4.2.3 Timing and Equilibrium
Altogether, if E is in the game at the beginning of period t, the sequence of events is as
follows:
1. Each bank decides whether to offer loan contracts or not. If yes, it chooses the
loan rate(s). If no bank offers loan contracts, the game is over and payoffs are 0
for all players.
2. E decides whether to undertake a project or not. If yes, she chooses the risk of
failure j ∈ {L,H} and the contract with the lowest loan rate for this risk (if more
than one bank offers the lowest loan rate, E chooses each of those offers with equal
probability). If not, the game is over and payoffs are 0 for all players.
3. The project is successful or not. In case of success, E receives the payoff from
the project, pays the loan rate to the bank and the game is over. Otherwise, she
defaults and enters the next period. The bank that financed the project incurs a
loss of 1.
Our main focus lies on the sequential equilibria of the game under the different in-
formational settings. In our model, any sequential equilibrium exhibits the following
features: Firstly, beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever E’s actions are observ-





for k ∈ {1, ..., N} in each period t of an equilibrium. Finally, E’s action in period t
maximizes her expected payoff for given belief and the banks’ decisions in subsequent
periods. A bank’s decisions in period t maximize its expected payoff for given belief and
other banks’ decisions in period t.8 To illustrate important results, we will also refer
sometimes to Nash equilibria of the game (in which beliefs do not play a role).
8To keep matters simple we suppress some notation here, which would be needed to define the se-
quential equilibrium formally. The first two points follow from the concept of “consistency” of strategies
and beliefs, the last point follows from “sequential rationality”. To proof “consistency” one usually has
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4.2.4 Projects and the First-Best Outcome
The high-risk project has a higher return than the low-risk project, i.e. yH > yL > 1.
Moreover, it holds that high skills and low risk increase the probability of success, i.e.
θH > θL and pH > pL. The projects taken by the high- (low-) skill entrepreneur always
have a positive (negative) net present value (NPV):
(1− pj)yj > 1 and (1− pj)θLyj < 1 for j ∈ {L,H} . (4.3)
E can trade off the expected return of a project against the maximal return,9 i.e. the
expected return from the low-risk project is higher than from the high-risk project:
Assumption (A1): We have yL > (1− pH) yH .
Consider an entrepreneur with “deep pockets” who knows that she has high skills and
who can finance projects by herself. Given that this entrepreneur has only one chance
to realize a project, she would choose the low-risk project if (A1) holds. If (A1) does
not hold, she would go for the high-risk project. Assume now that this entrepreneur
can start a new project in infinitely many periods like in our model, i.e. if she succeeds,
payoffs are realized and the game is over, otherwise she can start another project. Her
expected payoff from always choosing the high-risk project, V H1 , is then given by
V H1 = (1− pH) (yH − 1) + pH
(−1 + V H1 ) .
Solving for V H1 yields us
V H1 = yH −
1
1− pH .
Her expected payoff from choosing the low-risk project, V L1 , is given by
V L1 = yL − 1.
We will assume that V H1 > V
L
1 :
Assumption (A2): We have yH − 1
1− pH > yL − 1.
to construct a sequence of mixed strategies and beliefs (derived for a given strategy according to Bayes’
rule) which converges against the equilibrium strategy profile and equilibrium beliefs. For details we
refer to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pages 337 - 338. As equilibria in our model have a very simple
structure, we will do without this construction.
9Our results would be similar in a model in which E can trade-off those two variables continuously.
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If (A2) holds, then the entrepreneur with deep pockets and high skills would choose
j = H in each period. If (A2) does not hold, she would choose the low-risk project.
The assumptions in (A1) and (A2) can be fulfilled at the same time if and only if
yL > 1. This is ensured by the fact that both projects have a positive NPV as long as
the high-skill entrepreneur runs them.
We now derive the first-best outcome if (A1) and (A2) hold and the entrepreneur is
uncertain about her skills. Again assume that E has deep pockets and can finance all
projects by herself. Note that in period 1, her expected payoff from realizing the low-risk










If (4.4) does not hold, then the entrepreneur does not start any projects. As α1 < 1,
she will not finance high-risk projects in infinitely many periods, as her belief α˜Et → 0
for t → ∞, according to (4.1). If she anticipates in period t¯ that her belief α˜Et¯+1 will
be below the right-hand side of (4.4) in case of failure, then she chooses j = L in this













Note that this interval is always non-empty. We then get the first-best outcome:
Proposition 1 Assume that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then for each α1 ∈ I(θL, yL) there
is a number t¯α1 ∈ N, such that the entrepreneur with deep pockets chooses j = H
in the periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯α1 − 1} and j = L in period t = t¯α1 . For t¯ ∈ N there is a
αˆ1 < 1, such that t¯α1 > t¯ whenever α1 > αˆ1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
4.3 Equilibria under perfect information (PI)
In our first informational setting, banks can evaluate the riskiness of past and present
projects. As the NPV of projects run by a low-skill entrepreneur is negative, projects will
only be financed in finitely many periods. Facing Bertrand competition, banks only offer
loan rates, which generate zero profits in equilibrium. Hence, the expected repayment
equals the investment sum. If Bk then sells a loan contract to E to finance a project of








where α˜Bkt = α˜
E
t . As θL < 1, the loan rate decreases in α˜
Bk
t .
Let banks’ loan rates and E’s decisions be given for all t. Denote by Vt be the expected
payoff of E in the beginning of period t. If banks do not provide loans anymore (or if E
does not realize a project) in period t, Vt = 0. If E gets a loan from Bk in period t, her
expected payoff from realizing a project with risk j is
Vt = (1− pj)θ˜Et (yj − rkt (α˜Bkt , j)) + (1− (1− pj)θ˜Et )Vt+1. (4.6)
This allows us to calculate recursively E’s expected payoff V1.
4.3.1 The conservative equilibrium
We first show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which E gets finance only if she never
went bankrupt, i.e. in period 1 and never thereafter. If banks do not offer loans in
periods t ∈ {2, 3, ...}, we have V2 = 0. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) imply that E picks
j = L in period 1 if
θ˜E1 yL ≥ (1− pH)θ˜E1 yH .
This expression is equivalent to (A1). A bank Bk provides funding for a low-risk project
as long as
θ˜Bk1 yL − 1 ≥ 0,
which is satisfied if α1 ∈ I(θL, yL). It remains to show that banks do not provide loans
in t ∈ {2, 3, ...}. Note that failure of a low-risk project reveals low skills. As all banks
can observe E’s decisions, it is rational for them not to finance any more projects.
Lemma 1 If and only if (A1) holds and α1 ∈ I(θL, yL), then under PI there is a Nash
equilibrium, in which E chooses j = L in period 1. Banks finance the project in
this period, but do not provide loans in periods t ∈ {2, 3, ...}.
This equilibrium may, however, not be a sequential equilibrium. The threat that no
offers are made in period 2, even if E chooses j = H in period 1, may not be credible, as
all banks observe E’s decisions and can update their belief via Bayes’ rule. If E deviates
and chooses the high-risk project, it can be profitable for a bank to finance her after
failure given that α1 is sufficiently high. This is what we are going to show now.
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4.3.2 Experimental Equilibria
Assume that banks provide finance up to period t¯ > 1. As the failure of a low-risk
project reveals low skills, this only happens if E picks j = H in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯−1}.
Provided that (A1) holds, E faces the same trade-off in period t¯ as in the previous
subsection. In view of a zero-payoff in case of failure and a higher expected payoff from
the low-risk project, E chooses j = L. She might be willing to realize high-risk projects
in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯ − 1} if condition (A2) holds. With banks’ beliefs being derived







t−1, H) = 1.
For any t, we get that α˜Bkt → 1 as α˜Bk1 → 1. We obtain
θ˜Bkt¯ yL − 1 ≥ 0,
(1− pH)θ˜Bkt yH − 1 ≥ 0,
for t ∈ {1, ..., t¯−1} if α1 is sufficiently high. In these periods, projects’ NPV is positive, so
that banks provide loans to E. This allows us to establish the existence of experimental
equilibria:
Lemma 1 Let t¯ ∈ N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then under
PI there is a Nash equilibrium in which E chooses j = H in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯−1}
and j = L in period t¯. Banks finance all projects in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, but not
in periods t ∈ {t¯+ 1, t¯+ 2, ...}.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Again, not every experimental equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium: If in period t¯,
belief α˜Bkt¯ is sufficiently large, then banks can profitably finance projects in period t¯+ 1,
given that E chooses j = H in period t¯. The following result owes to the perfect
observability of past and present risk choices:
Proposition 2 If (A1), (A2) hold and α1 ∈ I(θL, yL), then under PI in any sequential
equilibrium, E chooses j = H in the periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯α1 − 1} and j = L in
period t¯α1 . Projects are financed in periods t ∈ {0, ..., t¯α1}, but not in periods
t ∈ {t¯α1 + 1, t¯α1 + 2, ...}.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Therefore, if entrepreneurial risk choices are perfectly observable, countries with similar
entrepreneurial skills and similar institutional constraints should expose the same scope
of the “stigma of failure”.
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4.4 Equilibria under private information of banks
(PRB)
In this section, we relax the assumption that banks can perfectly observe the riskiness of
all past projects. Instead, a bank only knows the risk of projects which it financed itself.
As in Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004), this enables banks to acquire private
information about E. The risk of projects financed by other banks remains unknown.
We thereby implicitly assume that banks cannot (or do not) infer the risk of past projects
from past loan rates.10
4.4.1 The conservative equilibrium
As in the last chapter, we can show that there is a conservative equilibrium if (A1)
holds and α1 is sufficiently large. Now this is a sequential equilibrium. To see why,
assume that E deviates and chooses j = H in period 1 instead of j = L. Further
assume that she gets financed by bank Bk. If her project fails, Bk updates its belief
about her type to α˜Bk1 according to Bayes’ rule as in (4.1). All other banks assume
that E has chosen the low-risk project in period 1. Their belief about E is α˜Bl2 = 0,
l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ..., N}. Thus, they will refuse to finance E’s project in a period
t > 1. This makes Bk a monopolistic supplier of finance to E. It can charge the maximal
loan rates, rkt (α˜
Bk
t , j) = yj, in all subsequent periods t > 1. E’s expected payoff then
equals zero. Therefore, it pays off for E to pick the project with the highest expected
return in period 1. We conclude:
Lemma 3 If and only if (A1) holds and α1 ∈ I(θL, yL), then under PRB there is a
sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = L in period 1. Banks finance
projects in this period, but do not provide loans in periods t ∈ {2, 3, ...}.
4.4.2 Experimental Equilibria
Experimental equilibria have the same form as in the last section: E chooses j = H in
the first t¯ − 1 periods and j = L in t¯. Given that E and banks (regardless of whether
they financed the projects of E or not) have the same beliefs on the equilibrium path,
banks charge a loan rate according to (4.5). For the same reasons as for a conserva-
tive equilibrium, these experimental equilibria must be also sequential equilibria. We
therefore obtain:
10This assumption is not innocuous if there are detailed credit registers. If banks infer previous risk
choices from the loan rates of past projects, then the results of the setting with perfect information
apply.
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Lemma 4 Let t¯ ∈ N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then
under PRB there is a sequential equilibrium in which E chooses j = H in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t¯ − 1} and j = L in period t¯. Banks finance all projects in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, but not in periods t ∈ {t¯+ 1, t¯+ 2, ...}.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Several experimental equilibria with different numbers of periods with project financing
exist simultaneously if α1 is sufficiently close to unity. Note that for a given α1 ∈
I(θL, yL), an equilibrium with t¯α1 periods of project financing may not exist: E could
probably gain by choosing j = L in all periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯} and switch to another bank
after each failure (as all banks which financed previous projects know for sure that E
has low skills). However, she will refrain from doing so as long as she feels reasonably
comfortable that she has high skills (i.e. as long as α1 and therefore α˜
E
t , t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, is
sufficiently high). Combining Lemmata 3 and 4 gives rise to our next result:
Proposition 3 Let t¯ ∈ N be given. If (A1), (A2) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then
under PRB both a conservative equilibrium (in which banks only finance projects
in period 1) and an experimental equilibrium (in which banks finance all projects
in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, but not in periods t ∈ {t¯ + 1, t¯ + 2, ...}) exist and are
sequential equilibria.
The multiplicity of sequential equilibria implies that the “stigma of failure” may differ
among countries with the same institutional environment and the same average level
of entrepreneurial skills. The outcome in the credit market depends on banks’ expec-
tations and E’s risk choices. If both cannot be altered simultaneously, changes in the
institutional environment may not have an impact on the “stigma of failure”. Before we
discuss this result’s welfare- and policy implications, we show that the same also obtains
if banks cannot control E’s current risk choice.
4.5 Equilibria under imperfect information (IM)
Finally, we also relax the assumption about banks’ control of E’s currently chosen risk
level. Instead, banks only know the period number, i.e. how many times E previously
went bankrupt. They are also aware of the fact that E can choose between a risky and
a less risky business strategy. Details, however, remain hidden to banks. This creates
moral hazard in the credit market: E may be inclined to choose the high risk if banks
charge a loan rate, which only covers low risk. Still, both conservative and experimental
equilibria can exist at the same time as sequential equilibria.
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4.5.1 The conservative equilibrium
For a conservative equilibrium, in which E chooses the low-risk project, we must rule out
that E can gain from picking a high-risk project. For this, we need to modify assumption
(A1):
Assumption (A1∗): We have yL − 1 > (1− pH)(yH − 1).
Note that (A1∗) implies (A1). Assume that E purchases the loan contract from Bk in
period 1. For a given loan rate rk1 , E prefers the low-risk project in this period if and
only if
θ˜E1 (yL − rk1) ≥ (1− pH)θ˜E1 (yH − rk1).
Rearranging terms yields us the inequality
rk1 ≤
yL − (1− pH)yH
pH
. (4.7)





By combining (4.7) and (4.8), we can show the existence of a conservative equilibrium:
Lemma 5 I f and only if (A1∗) holds and α1 is sufficiently high, then under IM there
is a sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = L in period 1. Banks finance
projects in this period, but do not provide loans in periods t ∈ {2, 3, ...}.
The threat of not providing further credits in the next periods is credible, as banks
cannot observe the risk choice of E. Thus, a conservative equilibrium is robust under
imperfect information.
4.5.2 Experimental Equilibria
In a sequential equilibrium with t¯ periods of project financing, banks correctly anticipate
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where α˜Bkt = α˜
E
t in all periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯} for k ∈ {1, ..., N}. Again, if (A1∗) holds
and α˜Bkt¯ is sufficiently close to unity, then in period t = t¯, E cannot gain by choosing
j = H instead of j = L. In order to show that E cannot profitably deviate in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t¯− 1}, we need to modify assumption (A2):
Assumption (A2∗): We have (1− pH)yH + 1
1− pH > yL + 1.
(A2∗) requires that a high-risk project’s expected payoff is not too small relative to a
low-risk project’s. Assumptions (A1∗) and (A2∗) can hold at the same time if and only
if pH > 0 (which is implied by the construction of the model). Note that (A2
∗) may
hold even if (A2) does not and vice versa. We now can show:
Lemma 6 Let t¯ ∈ N be given. If (A1∗), (A2∗) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then
under IM there is a sequential equilibrium, in which E chooses j = H in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t¯ − 1} and j = L in period t¯. Banks finance all projects in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, but not in periods t ∈ {t¯+ 1, t¯+ 2, ...}.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Again, it may well be that for given α1 ∈ I(θL, yL), an equilibrium with t¯α1 periods of
project financing does not exist, as loan rates are inflexible to entrepreneurial decisions:
E does not choose j = L in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯− 1} if she is relatively convinced of her
high skills (and therefore will be successful with the low-risk project in period t¯ with
high probability).
Consequently, the existence of multiple equilibria remains unaffected by the introduction
of imperfect information. Combining Lemmata 5 and 6 leads us to conclude:
Proposition 4 Let t¯ ∈ N be given. If (A1∗), (A2∗) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then
under IM both a conservative equilibrium (in which banks only finance projects
in period 1) and an experimental equilibrium (in which banks finance all projects
in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, but not in periods t ∈ {t¯ + 1, t¯ + 2, ...}) exist and are
sequential equilibria.
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4.6 Welfare and policy implications
The results under the different informational settings offer a new framework for the
analysis of welfare and policy making.
4.6.1 Welfare
Perfect Information and Private Information of Banks As banks make zero
expected profits in all periods, welfare is given by the E’s expected payoff V1 at the be-
ginning of the first period.11 We have shown that in the setting with perfect information,
the first-best outcome with t¯α1 periods of project financing is realized in any sequential
equilibrium. The tie-breaking rule for E implies that in any other Nash equilibrium with
fewer periods of project financing, E’s expected payoff must be smaller (as the low-risk
project is realized too soon). However, in the setting with private information of banks,
these equilibria can be sequential equilibria. This implies that the credit market outcome
with private information may be inefficient.
Consider now two assessments with t¯1 and t¯2, t¯1 < t¯2, periods of project financing, where
E picks j = H in the periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯l − 1} and j = L in period t¯l, l ∈ {1, 2}. By














1 , E could increase her expected payoff in period
t¯1 of the equilibrium with t¯2 periods of project financing by choosing j = L. The loan




1 , then the
tie-breaking rule implies that E chooses j = L in period t¯1. We conclude that welfare is
higher in an equilibrium with more periods of project financing than in an equilibrium
with fewer periods of project financing.
Imperfect Information Under imperfect information, things are more difficult. We
saw that an experimental equilibrium exists even if (A2) does not hold. Then, it is
against the E’s interest to realize high-risk projects. The reason is that after subtracting
the bank’s break-even loan rate, this project’s net return in case of success is lower
than for the low-risk project. E would prefer to realize projects with low risk. Yet, if
banks assume that E chooses the high-risk realization of the project, the high loan rate
prevents E from picking the low risk. This effect is the same as in models of asymmetric
information in which inefficient high-risk projects crowd out efficient low-risk projects. A
conservative then dominates any experimental equilibrium. However, (A1∗) and (A2)
11If we consider a continuum of entrepreneurs of mass 1, banks make zero profits for sure and welfare
is the aggregated payoff of entrepreneurs (which is equivalent to the expected payoff in our setting).
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can be fulfilled at the same time if and only if yL > 2. This implies that if yL ≤ 2
holds, any experimental equilibrium is dominated by a conservative equilibrium under
imperfect information.
Provided that yL > 2 and that assumptions (A1
∗), (A2) and (A2∗) are fulfilled, an
experimental equilibrium may well dominate a conservative equilibrium. We know from
Lemma 6 that if α1 is sufficiently high, there can simultaneously exist equilibria with
different numbers of periods of project financing. As before, we can show that an
equilibrium with more periods of project financing always dominates an equilibrium
with fewer periods of project financing in terms of welfare.
Example Consider a scenario with the following values: yL = 2.5, yH = 2.66, pH =
0.1, θL = 0.3, α1 = 0.9. It is straightforward to verify that assumptions (A1), (A1
∗),
(A2) and (A2∗) are satisfied for these values. Let the equilibrium loan rates for k ∈
{1, ..., N} be as follows:
rk1(α˜
Bk
1 ) = 1, 075,
r˜k1(α˜
Bk
1 ) = 1, 195,
r˜k2(α˜
Bk
2 ) = 1, 457.







k ∈ {1, ..., N}) is therefore V C1 = 1, 325. In contrast, an experimental equilibrium with








t ), k ∈ {1, ..., N},
t ∈ {1, 2}), leads to V E1 = 1, 363. The loan rates are chosen such that banks make
zero-profits in expectation. Both under (PI) and (IM), the experimental equilibrium
dominates the conservative one.
Now stick to the same setting, but with yL = 1.5 and yH = 1.55. Assumption (A2) is
violated, while the others remain fulfilled. As the underlying risk is the same as before,
the loan rates remain unchanged. Under (IM), there can be both the conservative
and the experimental equilibrium with two periods of project financing. Clearly, this
experimental equilibrium is inefficient, because of V C1 = 0, 395 and V
E
2 = 0, 303. In
contrast, under (PI), the experimental equilibrium does not exist.
4.6.2 Policy Implications
Banking System Design Our analysis shows that the observability of entrepreneurs’
past and present risk choices is a crucial feature that prevents inefficiencies in the credit
market. We think that a banking system, which is most likely to exhibit this feature, is
based on small, specialized and regional banks or on venture capitalists. Such institutions
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keep close ties to their clients and may well observe the risk involved in past and present
business decisions. Some empirical support for this result comes from a comparison of
the EU and Japan to the US: by trend, a more (less) pronounced “stigma of failure”
seems to go in hand with more bank finance (market finance).
Economies with a financial system in which banks are able to observe past and present
risk choices should be left unchanged. As the highest equilibrium level of welfare is
attained in any sequential equilibrium, there is no room for policies aimed at changing
the nature of the equilibrium. In particular, a conservative equilibrium may be the
result of a relatively low level of average entrepreneurial skills. Yet, De Meza (2002) and
ABRP (2002) caution that most businesses failures stem from low project quality and
management incompetence. Hence, enabling more entrepreneurs might simply result in
more costly failures.
On the contrary, large banks may be too distant to their borrowers in order to evaluate
the risk of failed projects. These creditors mainly rely on statistical data (“credit scor-
ing”), so that the results of the settings with private information of banks or imperfect
information apply. As entrepreneurs choose the low-risk project to early in some equi-
libria, the outcome in the credit market may be inefficient. Policies aiming at changing
the nature of the equilibrium may not be effective, as many entrepreneurs’ actions and
banks’ expectations must be changed simultaneously. Consider for example the approach
adopted by the European Commission (2000, 2007) through programs initiated in the
aftermath of the Lisbon Council in 2000. Among other things, it foresees reducing the
stigma of failure by advising entrepreneurs to choose higher risk levels. Entrepreneurs
will follow such advice only if banks change their policy at the same time. This remains
impossible as long as banks do not understand better the risk involved in their clients’
business.
Improving Entrepreneurial Skills Another measure of the EU to increase en-
trepreneurial activity is education, formation of relevant skills and early support for
viable enterprises (see European Commission, 2007). In our model, such policies are re-
flected by an increase in α1. If banks have perfect information, an increase in the share
of skilled entrepreneurs α1 has a direct and an indirect effect on welfare in a sequential
equilibrium: the loan rate decreases in all periods, see equation (4.5), and it (weakly)
increases the number t¯α1 of periods in which projects are financed in equilibrium (see
Proposition 1).
However, under private information or imperfect information of banks, inflexible beliefs
about entrepreneurial decisions deter policy’s impact on the nature of the equilibrium.
Unless banks’ credit offers and agents’ risk-taking behavior becomes simultaneously co-
ordinated to another equilibrium, only the direct effect will materialize.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a multi-period credit market model where the extent to which failed
entrepreneurs are excluded from further start-up financing is determined endogenously.
The results’ key driver is the evolution of a banks belief with regard to an entrepreneur’s
skills and its interplay with her risk choices. If the probability of high skills is sufficiently
large, multiple equilibria may obtain. We observed that under perfect information (i.e.
if banks can evaluate both past and present risk choices of an entrepreneur), in any
sequential equilibrium the first-best outcome is realized. Second, under private informa-
tion of banks (i.e. if banks can evaluate only the risk of projects which were financed by
themselves), both a conservative and experimental equilibria are sequential equilibria.
The multiplicity of equilibria is robust. Finally, the same result obtains if banks cannot
evaluate the risk of any projects. We concluded that the outcome in credit markets
where banks do not always observe the full history of entrepreneurial risk choices can
be inefficient. Policy measures aiming at lowering the “stigma of failure” might not be
effective, because banks’ expectations and entrepreneurs’ actions must simultaneously
be shifted to a new equilibrium. However, our results also leave room for regulation: a
banking system with small banks that know well their clients’ business should be more
prone to achieving an efficient allocation than one with arms-length finance.
Altogether, our paper is a starting point that offers ample scope for future research. It
allows for the incorporation of numerous additional factors that might influence credit
market conditions, such as education, social security, or the tax system. More specif-
ically, the integration of learning would result in a lower decline of financiers’ beliefs
about entrepreneurs’ skills over time. A population’s age distribution should also mat-
ter, as younger agents have a higher risk appetite and thus readiness to create new firms,
see Le´vesque and Minniti (2006). Related work suggests taking into account multi-tool
contracts (that include risk monitoring or quality screening) or various effects of the
creation of innovative firms, such as technological- or demand-spillovers. At last, more
convincing empirical evidence is needed to support effective policy making.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2 The incentive compatible set of (q;x) is feasible if and only if the following con-
ditions are satisfied: q̂ ≤ 1 and the lower bound on x from (2.5) for q = 1 cannot be higher than
1− kH . This is equivalent to:
1 ≥ γ ≥ max
{
(1 + δ)∆k













The first term is obtained by inserting x = 1 − kH and q = 1 into (2.5) and solving for γ. The
second term is the smaller solution of the quadratic inequality implied by q̂ ≤ 1. Both terms are
smaller than 1 and the second term is also bigger than 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 3 (2.6) can be ignored if q̂ is not higher than q for which (2.5) is equal to 1− kH .
This is equivalent to
1 ≥ γ ≥ (1 + δ)(1− kH)
(1 + δ)(1− kH) + ∆k(1 + δ) + (δ − rD)(1− kL) .
1 (A.2)
Now I compare three lower bounds from (A.1) and (A.2) in order to determine the range of
parameters for which the supervisor is not constrained in choosing q. If rH ≥ 1 + 2rL − b, the
first lower bound from (A.1) is the biggest. This case is however ruled out by (2.8), because
2rL− rD < 1+2rL− b. If rH < 2rL− rD, these three bounds cross at δ = (∆k)
2+rD(1−kL)2
(1−kH)(1+kH−2kL) ≡ δ˜.
δ˜ is higher than rD because it holds that (1− kL)2 > (1− kH)(1 + kH − 2kL). However, δ˜ is not
always smaller than rL. It is smaller iff





If δ˜ ≥ rL, what may occur if (2.8) is weaker than (A.3), the first bound from (A.1) is again
the biggest. If δ˜ < rL, the first of these lower bounds is again the biggest for rD ≤ δ < δ˜. If
δ˜ < δ < rL, the lower bound from (A.2) is the biggest. The supervisor is not constrained by




and (2.8) is weaker than (A.3) or (A.3) and (A.2) hold.




, may hold iff its right hand side is not higher
1The lower bound lies between 12 and 1.
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than b+ rD due to (2.1). This implies a quadratic inequality in b with a solution
b≥(1 + rD)
√
rL(1 + rL)− rD(1 + rL)>rL − rD.
Hence the first condition in Lemma 3 holds for b sufficiently high.
Proof of Lemma 5 I start the proof with the case, which is the closest to the case of recapitalization.
(i) sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)]. After inserting VH(s) and VL(s) into (2.9) and (2.10) and rearranging
them, they become
s ≥ 1− ∆k
q(1− γ) and s ≤ 1−
∆k




− (1 + rD)
)
. (A.4)
The procedure to find out for which parameters the incentive compatible set of (q; sA) is feasible




− 11−γ δ−rD+rL−rH1+rD in which both constraints intersect, this region is not empty
if s for which the constraints intersect is not higher than sMH(pH) and it holds that q̂ ≤ 1.
The first condition is equivalent to 1 ≥ γ ≥ 1
1+ b1+δ
> 1/2 (this is guaranteed by the fact that
1 > b > rH − rD) and the second to
1 ≥ γ ≥ 2(1 + δ) + rL − rH −
√
(2(1 + δ) + rL − rH)2 − 4(1 + rD)(1 + δ)
2(1 + rD)
> 1/2.2
The region in which sA and q make the banks report truthfully is not empty for
1 ≥ γ ≥ max
[
2(1 + δ) + rL − rH −
√







(ii) s ∈ (sMH(pL); 1]. The constraint for the bank H remains like the one in the case above.
For the bank L after inserting VL(sA) into the IC constraint, it gets s ≤ 1− ∆k(1+δ)bqγ . This time
the IC constraints for both types do not cross, hence the region in which the equilibrium may
exist is not empty when the IC constraint for L is above of the one for H. This requires that
1 ≥ γ ≥ 1
1+ b1+δ
. Moreover, combinations of (sA; q) which are incentive compatible for both types
are feasible iff the IC constraint for the bank L lies above of sMH(pH) for q = 1. This requires
that




















> b > rH − rD. However this interval is not empty if (2.7) is
strengthened to
δ − rD − rH + rL ≥ δ − rD1 + δ (rH − rD).
Hence the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff











2This is guaranteed by (2.7).
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(iii) sA ∈ [0; kH ]. This case differs from the previous ones due to the full equity financing. First,
the bank H is indifferent between selling or not. Second, the selling is profitable for the bank L




(1− kH)(1− γ) ; 1
]
and s ≥ 1 + δ
(1 + rD)qγ
− (δ − rD)(1− kH)
rH − rL .
The combinations of q and sA are incentive compatible for both banks if the IC condition for the





. This is equivalent to
kH ≥ 1 + δ(1 + rD)qγ −
(δ − rD)(1− kH)
rH − rL and q = max
[
∆k
(1− kH)(1− γ) ; 1
]
.
If γ ≥ 1−kL1−kH , the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff





(δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL)
]
.
If γ < 1−kL1−kH , the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff
γ ∈
[
(1 + δ)(1− kH)





If the last interval is not empty, it holds that
(1 + δ)(1− kH)
(1 + 2δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) ≥
(1 + δ)∆k
(δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL)
and the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff
1 ≥ γ ≥ (1 + δ)(1− kH)
(1 + 2δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) .
However, if the interval in (A.5), it holds that
1− kL
1− kH ≤
(1 + δ)(1− kH)
(1 + 2δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) ≤
(1 + δ)∆k
(δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) .
and the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff
1 ≥ γ ≥ (1 + δ)∆k
(δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) .
Hence, the incentive compatible (sA; q) are feasible iff
1 ≥ γ ≥ max
[
(1 + δ)∆k
(δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL) ;
(1 + δ)(1− kH)
(1 + 2δ − rD)(1− kH) + kH(rH − rL)
]
.
Summarizing, the truth-telling equilibria exist iff









for sA ∈ [0; kH ]









for sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)]









for sA ∈ [sMH(pH); 1] and
δ − rD − rH + rL ≥ δ−rD1+δ (rH − rD)
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Proof of the Lemma 6 The constraint on q is relevant only for sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)]. q̂ is irrelevant
for the supervisor if s, for which the IC constraints intersect, is below or at kH . This is equivalent
to
1 ≥ γ ≥ max
[
(1 + δ)(1− kH)





The first term in the square brackets is higher than 1/2 iff
rH − rD < b < min
[
(1 + rD)2
1 + rD + rH − rL + rH − rD; 1
]
.
Proof of Lemma 7 Again I have to deal with three cases.
(i) sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pL)]. Conditions for the pooling equilibrium, i.e. such that both banks report
L, are
VH−(δ−rD)∆k ≥ [1− q(1− γ)]VH+q(1−γ) [s(rH − rD − pL(1 + δ)) + pL(1 + δ)− (δ − rD)kH ]
for the bank H and
VL ≥ (1− qγ)(b− (1 + δ)kH) + qγ [s(rL − rD − pL(1 + δ)) + pL(1 + δ)− (δ − rD)kH ]
for the bank L, where pL = rL−δ1+δ . The pooling equilibrium exists iff q and sA satisfying the above
conditions are feasible, which is equivalent to
kH ≤ s ≤ min
[
1− ∆k
rH − rD − rL + δ
δ − rD















(1− kH)(δ − rD) + (1 + rD)∆k ;
(1− kH)(rH − rD − rL + δ)− (δ − rD)∆k
(1− kH)(rH − rD − rL + δ)
]
.
After some manipulations, the last interval is not empty under (2.8) iff




(1− kH)(1 + kH − 2kL)
)
.
(ii) s ∈ (sMH(pL); 1]. The condition guaranteeing that the bank L reports truthfully is
VL ≥ (1− qγ)(b− (1 + δ)kH) + qγ [sb− (δ − rD)kH ] .
As for the case (ii) in the proof of Lemma 5 the conditions for which the banks report L do not
cross. The region in which the pooling equilibrium exists is given by the following constraint
sMH(pL) ≤ s ≤ min
[
1− ∆k
rH − rD − pL(1 + δ)
δ − rD





Proceeding as above one can show that the region in which the pooling equilibrium exists is not
empty iff rH < 1 − b + 2rL, which is weaker than (2.8). Hence, the pooling equilibrium always
exists for s ∈ [kH ; 1]. Analogous proceeding yields the result that for s ∈ [0; kH) there is no
pooling equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 8 If sA ∈ [0; kH ], then after inserting the IC constraint W2 is strictly decreasing in





(δ − rD)− kH(δ − rD + rL − rH) .
One has to note that in this case as the bank L finds it profitable to be downsized, the penalty
is to set the highest possible sA.
If sA ∈ [sMH(pH); 1], after inserting the IC constraint for the bank L into W2 and rearranging it,
it is again strictly decreasing in q. Hence, the solution is again the lowest q and sA = sMH(pH).





b+ rD + rH − rL − δ
b
.
If sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)], after inserting the IC constraint for the bank L into W2, rearranging it
and eliminating terms independent of q W2 becomes q
(
m−m), where m ≡ δ−rDδ−rD+rL−rH (rH −
rL)(1− γ) > m. Then if m > m, then the supervisor chooses the lowest q = q(kH) and s = kH .
If m < m, the supervisor chooses the highest possible q = q(sMH(pH)) and s = sMH(pH).
Given that for the two extremes cases the solution is the same as for the two cases arising under
sA ∈ [kH ; sMH(pH)] and W2 is continuous at the boundaries sA = kH and sA = sMH(pH), I
obtain the optimal solution stated in Lemma 8.
Proof of Proposition 1 Here I compare the implementation cost of both regimes. These implemen-
tation costs amount to the monitoring cost incurred by the supervisor and the cost of penalty










γ − (1 + rD)
) if m ≥ m
if m < m












m+ (1− γ) rH−rLb+rD+rH−rL−δ (δ − rD)
] if m ≥ m
if m < m.
The comparison of Cr and Cs has to be done for three intervals. The first one is for m ≥ m.
Here it is sufficient to compare the optimal probabilities of inspection. It turns out that qs >
qr ⇔ 1 > kH , hence recapitalization is better. Now I turn to the third interval, m ∈ [0;m).
Downsizing yields higher welfare for
m > m
b(γ(1 + rD)− (1 + δ)) + (δ − rD)(1 + δ)
b(γ(1 + rD)− (1 + δ)) + (δ − rD)(1 + δ)− (rH − rL)(1 + δ) > m.
Hence, recapitalization delivers higher welfare in this interval too. Now the second interval
m ∈ [m;m). I rewrite Cr and Cs as functions of m:
Cr(m) =





(1 + δ)∆k(1− γ)
γ
δ − rD
δ − rD + rL − rH + q
(
m−m) .
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First, it holds that in both cases these functions are continuous at m = m and m = m. Second,
it holds for the optimal q that




∆k(1 + δ) + (δ − rD)(1− kL) ,
meaning that the slope of Cs(m) is higher than of Cr(m) for m > m. These two facts together
with the fact that in the first and third interval recapitalization has lower cost, leads to the
conclusion that recapitalization always delivers higher welfare.
Proof of Proposition 2 When m > m, rearranging ∆W1 ≥ 0 after plugging q1 and x1 yields
γ ≥ (1 + δ) ((δ − rD)(1− kH) +m)
(δ − rD)[(1 + δ)(1− kH) + ∆k(1 + δ) + (δ − rD)(1− kL)] . (A.6)
The term on the right hand side builds the upper part of the function separating the dominance
regions, γ1(δ). Deriving this term with respect to δ delivers
−
[
m [(1 + rD)(∆k + (1 + 2δ)(1− kH)− rD(1− kL) + 2(1 + δ)(δ − rD)(1− kH)] +
(δ − rD)2(1 + rD)(1− kL)(1− kH)
]
[(δ − rD)[(1 + δ)(1− kH) + ∆k(1 + δ) + (δ − rD)(1− kL)]]2
< 0,
proving that the upper part of γ1(δ) is decreasing in δ. For sufficiently low m the function implied
by (A.6) may intersect with the first lower bound from (A.1), meaning that this bound becomes
a part of γ1(δ). This bound is also strictly decreasing in δ, as its derivative with respect to δ is
−(1 + rD)∆k(1− kL) [∆k(1 + δ) + (δ − rD)(1− kL)]−2 < 0.
If m < m, the condition for ∆W1 ≥ 0 is
δ ≥ γ
2(1 + rD)






The last expression defines implicitly the lower part of γ1(δ). The derivative of the right hand
side term of the last expression with respect to γ is negative for γ ∈ (1/2; 1):
∂δ
∂γ
= − (2γ − 1)−2
[





Because the right hand side term is invertible for positive δ and γ ∈ (1/2; 1), the lower part of
γ1(δ) is also decreasing. The function implied by (A.7) lies above of the second lower bound
from (A.1) (rearranging the latter delivers δ ≥ γ2(1+rD)2γ−1 − 1). One has to keep in mind that for
m < m the function implied by (A.2) has no bite, because for m < m the optimal q1 is 1.
Rearranging (A.6) and (A.7) for γ = 1 − mrH−rL shows that they both intersect exactly at






















− m∆k ( m∆k−4(1+δ))4(1+rD)2 for m ≤ m,
where the last expression is the smaller solution of the quadratic inequality implied by (A.7).
The other solution of this inequality is always higher than 1 for m < m.
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Proof of Proposition 3 After inserting q3 in ∆W3 the condition for ∆W3 to be not bigger than 0
is as follows:
γ ≥ [m+ S + ∆k(δ − rD)] (1 + δ)
(rH − rD − (δ − rD)kH)(δ − rD) + [S + ∆k(δ − rD)] (1 + δ) ≡ γ2(δ).
The derivative of γ2(δ) has ambiguous sign and reads
∂γ2(δ)
∂δ
= [(rH − rD − (δ − rD)kH)(δ − rD) + [S + ∆k(δ − rD)] (1 + δ)]−2 (1 + rD) b(rH − rL)(δ − rD)2−S [(rH − rD)(1 + δ)2 − b(δ − rD)(2 + δ − rD)]
−m [(2rH − rD − rL)(1 + δ)2 − b(δ − rD)(2 + δ − rD)]
 .
The nominator of this derivative defines a second order polynom of δ. For δ close to rD the
nominator is negative implying that for small δ the function γ2(δ) is strictly decreasing for S > 0
and m > 0. It is possible that if S and m are sufficiently small, then the sign of the derivative
will turn to positive, implying that γ2(δ) starts to increase for some δ sufficiently far away from
rD. Moreover, as in the case of recapitalization the part or even the whole γ2(δ) can be given
by (2.11). This could happen if m and S are sufficiently low, meaning that the expected cost
of inspection and closure is negligible, which in the light of q3 ≤ 1 means the that insensitive
capital requirements deliver lower welfare. In such a case only (2.11) is the relevant condition.
Proof of Proposition 4 For m > m the derivative of S(δ) with respect to δ is quite a complicated
object. However it can be shown that it has following properties. Its nominator is a quadratic
function of δ with a negative term at δ2. Its maximum is a linear and decreasing function in
the parameter m and evaluated at m = m it is 0. Then because for any m > m the maximum
is negative the sign of the nominator is always negative, hence S(δ) is decreasing in δ. For
m ∈ (0;m] the matters are more complicated. Again one can analyze the sign of the nominator
of the derivative. It turns out that its maximum (-1) is lower than δ = rD. Hence one can look
at the sing of the derivative at this point. It turns out that for m close to m it is negative, so
S(δ) is decreasing in δ. However, at m = 0 the nominator is equal to
−∆k(1 + rD) [b(1− γ)− (rL − rD)] ,
whose sign is not clear cut. This means that S(δ) may have an inverted U-shape.
Proof of Proposition 5 There are several observations to make in order to simplify the problem.
First, the moral hazard constraint for the bank L binds, because then the truthtelling constraint
for this bank is relaxed and the credit supply is maximized. In what follows I use Ii ≡ Ab−ri .
Second, the balance sheet constraints bind yielding Di = Ii − A. Third, the worst case is when
the capital requirements are insensitive, what imposes a lower bound on the size of the bank H,
i.e. IH ≥ IL. Fourth, there is no moral hazard after equity injection r, once the truthtelling
constraint for the bank L holds. This is the same result as at the beginning of Section 2.3. The
bank L engages in moral hazard after equity injection when
(1 + rL)IH −DH + r < bIH or r < (b− rL)(IH − IL).
Then the truthtelling constraint for such a bank reads
r ≥ b(IH − IL)
qγ(1 + δ)
.
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It is easy to show that under δ < rL the RHS of the last expression is always higher than the
RHS of the previous one for any q. Fifth, the truthtelling constraint for the bank L binds at
optimum as any increase in IH , r and q that makes it slack leads to a decrease in social welfare.3
Moreover, I will assume that γ is so high that the truthtelling constraint for the bank H can be
ignored.











(1− γ)(b− rL)(IH − IL)−m
]
s.t.
IH ≥ IH ≥ IL, 1
γ
b(IH − IL)
δd+ (b− rL)(IH − IL)
≤ q ≤ 1,
where the second constraint emerges after inserting the truthtelling constraint for the bank L
into the constraint for the upper bound on r .
There are two cases to analyze.
First, if d ≥
[
b









δd+ (b− rL)(IH − IL)
≤ 1
for every IH . It is easy to show that for this case there are only three solutions possible from
which one has to choose the one that yields the highest social welfare. There are two solutions for
IH = IH depending on the sign
[
(1− γ)(b− rL)(IH − IL)−m
]
. If the sign is positive (negative)
it holds that q = 1 (q = 1γ
b(IH−IL)
δd+(b−rL)(IH−IL) = q
∗). The third solution is IH = IL and q = 0 .
It remains to show that there is no interior solution for IH . Assume that such a solution exists.
It can only exist when q = 1γ
b(IH−IL)
δd+(b−rL)(IH−IL) . If q = 1 it would be better to increase IH to IH .
An interior solution for q does not exist either as the objective function is linear in q. However, if
one explores the function which emerges after inserting q = 1γ
b(IH−IL)
δd+(b−rL)(IH−IL) into the objective
function, it turns out that it is a parabola of the following form
rHγ(b− rL)I2H + [−bm−A(b(1− γ) + rHγ) + δd(−b(1− γ) + rHγ)] IH + bIL [m+A(1− γ)] .





. Hence, there is no interior solution for IH .








(1− γ)(b− rL) + max
[
rH − 1−γγ b
q∗




the insensitive capital requirements deliver the highest social welfare. The precise solution de-
pends on the sign of the term rH− 1−γγ b. If this term is negative, i.e. γ < bb+rH , then the solution
with IH = IL and q = q∗ always yields lower social welfare than the other two solutions.
3The truthtelling constraint for the bank L becomes









Second, if d <
[
b





δ , there are only two solutions. IH = IH cannot




δd+(b−rL)(IH−IL) = 1. The comparison of these two solutions delivers that the insensitive




b(1− γ) + γrL − (1− γ)
)
δd.
Model with outside investors from Section 2.7.4 The basic model is modified as follows: In ad-
dition to the capital that the bank has, A, it is allowed issue uninsured outside financing, D,
to boost the amount of lending.4 The outside investors do not have the possibility to recognize
the type of the bank and have to rely on the supervisor in using his power to inspect, recognize
the type and punish the undercapitalized bank. There are two types of banks as in the previous
case. L is more riskier than H with the following return structure:{
R, with prob. pi
0, with prob. 1− pi and pH > pL.
If the supervisor is able to make the banks reveal the true risk, the solution to the model, i.e.
the rate of return and the amount of outside financing, is such as if the investors knew the type
of the bank (moral hazard is still present). The solution is as follows. Moral hazard puts a upper
level on the bank’s balance sheet
pi(RI −RDD) ≥ bI and L = A+D
and is value-destroying leaving nothing for the outside investors once the bank takes private
benefits
piR > 1 > b.
The outside investors are competitive and require rate of return equal to 0. They provide funding
only if the bank does not take private benefits. The bank maximizing its payoff will take so much
outside financing that the moral hazard and participation constraint of the outside investors bind






1− (piR− b)A and Ii =
1
1− (piR− b)A.
Hence the capital requirements imposed by the market are interesting, if pHR − b < 1. It holds
that DH > DL, which means that when the investors recognize the types they will provide more
financing for the good types.
Now, I analyze the decision of the supervisor to enforce the truthtelling. For simplicity I assume
that the supervisor closes the undercapitalized bank and commits to the supervisory scheme,
where q is the probability of inspection. The bank L report true risk if the expected payoff from
misreporting is lower than truthtelling. Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint is






4For simplicity insured deposits are disregarded.
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If γ = 1, the right hand side is always lower than 1, which means that with the sufficiently high
probability of inspection the supervisor will always be able to enforce the risk-sensitive capital
requirements.
However, if the right hand side is higher than 1 the bank L always finds profitable to misreport.
In such a case the investors disregard information provided by the banks and provide the funding
to both types of banks that corresponds to the highest risk:
RD,H = RD,L =
1
pL
, DH = DL =
pLR− b
1− (pLR− b)A.
The right hand side of the previous expression may be higher than 1 for sufficiently low γ, b
and pL, as well as for sufficiently high pH and R. Hence if γ is low, meaning that the quality of
supervisor inspection is low, the investors disregard information from the banks and will require
high rate of return and provide low amount of financing from all banks. Such a behavior results
in a low credit expansion.
i can be treated as a point-in-time ranking, i.e. the current risk of loan portfolio. If the supervisor
allows that banks to average out the risk of loans across the cycle in order to boost the credit
supply, the bank L could report more favorable information (if its loans had lower risk in a
previous period). In a model with continuous types of risks, the outside investors worried about
the probability of default will not accept such a modified information and will judge the banks
by the worst current i, as they will not be able to distinguish between the banks on their own.
Hence, an attempt to boost credit supply by making capital requirements less sensitive to i will
fail.
Proof of Lemma 10 The program can be rewritten as
min
(q,x,f)
qm+ q(1− γ)((δ − rD)x+ δf)
s.t.:
ICML: x ≥ ∆k
ICTT : qγ [(δ − rD)x+ (1 + δ)f + (1 + rD)∆k] ≥ ∆k(1 + δ)
IR: (δ − rD)x+ (1 + δ)f ≤ rL − rD − (δ − rD)kH
0 ≤ q ≤ 1
The truth-telling constraint, ICTT , is binding, because otherwise any decrease in q, x or f is still
incentive compatible and increases the implementation cost. Hence, I can solve ICTT for f and

















x ≥ ∆k and 1
γ
∆k(1 + δ)
rH − rD − (δ − rD)kH ≤ q ≤ 1.
At an optimum, q and the term in the square brackets in the objective function are the small-
est. There are two solutions, because the term in the square brackets can be negative or
positive for x = ∆k. If it is positive, q has to be the smallest and the solution is x = ∆k,
q = 1γ
∆k(1+δ)
rH−rD−(δ−rD)kH and f such that IC for truth-telling holds with equality for these x and q.
If it is negative, the optimal solution delivers q = 1, x = ∆k and f such that IC for truth-telling
holds with equality for these x and q. The former solution occurs for m ≥ (1− γ)rD∆k .
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Proof of Proposition 1 Let ∆(l, d, θ) = Ur(l, d, θ) − Un(θ) denote the difference in utility from re-
paying the loan or not:
∆(l, d, θ) =

u(α− l − s) + δu(θ + s(1 + d))− u(1 + α)− δu(θ) for θ ∈ [θ, θs]
u(α− l)− u(1 + α) for θ ∈ (θs, θ].
where s = s(l, d, θ) are the optimal savings of individuals. Observe that ∆ is continuous in θ, by
the continuity of u(c).
Moreover ∆(l, d, θ) is strictly decreasing for all θ ∈ [θ, θs). Differentiating ∆(l, d, θ) and using the
envelope theorem, together with the fact that optimal savings in the range [θ, θs) are positive
and u′′(c) < 0, we obtain
∂∆(l, d, θ)
∂θ
= δ [u′(θ + s(1 + d))− u′(θ)] < 0.
Finally, ∆(l, d, θ) is positive for θ near θ as lim
θ→θ
∆(l, d, θ) = +∞ by u(θ) = −∞, and it is clearly
negative for θ ∈ (θs, θ]. From the monotonicity of ∆(l, d, θ) and its values on θ and θs, we
conclude that there exists a threshold θ̂(l, d), such that ∆(l, d, θ) > 0 when θ < θ̂(l, d), which
means that borrowers with θ < θ̂(l, d) repay the loan. On the other hand, for individuals with
θ > θ̂(l, d) it is satisfied that ∆(l, d, θ) < 0, which means that borrowers with θ > θ̂(l, d) default
on their loan.
The second result follows from the above proof as if ∆(l, d, θ) is strictly decreasing on [θ, θs) and
∆(l, d, θ) is negative for θs then it must be that θ̂(l, d) < θs.
Proof of Lemma 1 The threshold θ̂(l, d) is implicitly defined by the equation
u(α− l − s) + δu(θ̂ + s(1 + d)) = u(1 + α) + δu(θ̂).
Decreasing (increasing) the loan (deposit) rate increases the left hand side of the equation without
any effect on the right hand side. Hence the previously indifferent individual is now better off
by not defaulting on the loan.
Proof of Proposition 4 Those individuals for whom their θ comes from F1 have worse outside options
on average than those whose θ comes from F2. Using Proposition 1, we can show that for a given
l and d the repayment rate is higher for individuals under F1 than for those under F2, i.e.
F1(θ̂(l, d)) > F2(θ̂(l, d)).
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Definitions of Variables
Default : is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is not repaid 3 months after its due date
Female: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the borrower is a woman.
Income: is the income of the borrower which he obtained in the last 12 months. Income is the sum
of income from all the sources given in the data (self employment, dependent employment, obtained
financial help and pensions).
Income others: is the sum of the income obtained by the other people in the borrower’s household.
Savings: are the savings the borrower reported.
Average wage (female/male): is the average wage in non agricultural activities in the village of the
borrower by gender.
Dependency ratio: is the ratio of the number of individuals not obtaining any income to those obtaining
in the household.
Age: is the borrower’s age when he was granted the loan.
Education: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the borrower reports positive number of years
of attending the school or taking part in educational activities offered by e.g. NGOs. We use the dummy
because these other education activities cannot be coded as a concrete number of education years.
Microfinance group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the microfinance
institutions reported in the sample.
NGO group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the non governmental
organizations reported in the sample.
Relatives group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the relatives.
Banks: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the commercial banks reported
in the sample.
Bank availability: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if someone in the village accessed commercial
banking services
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Model with competing alternative savings
This section analyses the individuals decision in a context in which the individual has the opportunity
of accessing a savings technology different for that of the monopolistic bank of our main section.
In this section the individual has the opportunity of accessing a savings technology different from that
of the monopolistic bank. With this savings technology the individual receives 1 + r for every unit of
savings. We assume that the realization of this opportunity of savings is not observable by the original
bank. If not the original bank would offer different deposit and loan rates to those individuals which
have the opportunity to save.
Hence the decision of defaulting on the loan granted by the original bank, following the same intuition
as in the main section, can be characterized as
u(α− l − so) + u(θ + so(1 + d))− [u(1 + α− sz) + u(θ + sz(1 + r))] < 0
whereso are the optimal savings of the individual in the monopolistic bank andsz are the savings under
the new alternative.
The threshold for the individual that defaults is defined asθ˜. Whereθ˜ is such that
u(α− l − so) + u(θ + so(1 + d)) = u(1 + α− sz) + u(θ + sz(1 + r)).
Hence, in a model with alternative savings technologies the fraction of individuals that do not default
will beF (θ˜).
Recall thatθˆ is the threshold of default for those individuals that do not have an alternative savings
technology. It can be proved thatF (θ˜) ≤ F (θˆ), so when a profitable source of savings is included
the default rate of the monopolistic bank increases. This is because individuals can default on the
monopolistic bank and deposit their savings in the other savings technology.
Lemma When an alternative savings technology is introduced the default rate of the monopolistic
bank (weakly) increases.
Proof When r≥d, or in other words, when the alternative technology offers the same or higher deposit
rate as the monopolistic bank, then the default rate of the economy increases. More precisely in
our setup the default rate goes to 1, which would in equilibrium mean that no bank would grant
loans to the individuals in the first period.
It is direct to show that, when r≥d, then
u(α− l − so) + u(θ + so(1 + d)) < u(1 + α− sz) + u(θ + sz(1 + r)).
Whensz = so thenu(θ+so(1+d)) ≤ u(θ+sz(1+r)) andu(α−l−so) < u(1+α−sz). Therefore the
above inequality holds. The individual can always have the same income when old and increase
his income when young by defaulting. Hence, the individual is better off defaulting on the loan
of the monopolistic bank and saving in the alternative technology independently of its outside
optionθ.
Whenr < d the default rate of the economy may not increase. But it will never decrease as
the individuals can always choose not to save through the new savings mechanism and then he
would in fact react as if the new savings mechanism was not present. The default rate increases
if the individual previously indifferent in defaulting now prefers to default. This happens when
the following condition holds
u(α− l − so) + u(θˆ + so(1 + d)) < u(1 + α− sz) + u(θˆ + sz(1 + r)) (B.1)
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When r < d this condition (B.1) may not hold. If the alternative strategy offers a low sav-
ings rate then individuals withθˆ may continue to find it profitable to repay and save with bet-
ter deposit rates than to default and use the new savings mechanism. Condition (B.1) holds
wheneversz(l, r, θˆ) = 0, that is when individuals withθˆ do not find it profitable so save under the
alternative technology. Whensz(l, r, θˆ) = 0 then by definition it is satisfied thatu(1 + α − sz) +
u(θˆ + sz(1 + r)) = u(1 + α) + u(θˆ), which recall definedθˆ in the first place. On the other hand
ifsz(l, r, θˆ) > 0 then it is satisfied thatu(1 + α− sz) + u(θˆ+ sz(1 + r)) > u(1 + α) + u(θˆ). In this
case the individual withθˆ is better off by defaulting and therefore the default rate of the economy
increases. In such case the indifferent individual will be defined byθ˜ such that
u(α− l − so) + u(θ˜ + so(1 + d)) = u(1 + α− sz) + u(θ˜ + sz(1 + r)),
where θ˜ < θˆ.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that are going to be used in our future
analysis. The descriptive statistics are shown for those observations in which a loan was taken. It must
be taken into account that for some of our analysis some variables are constructed using information
of observations in which no loan was taken. Examples of this are the average wage of female and male
individuals.
Variable Mean Std deviation Min Max Observations
Default 0.120 0.325 0 1 6385
Female 0.748 0.434 0 1 6385
Dowry 0.161 0.391 0 5 5421
Average wage female 27.652 10.470 6 60 2188
Average wage male 76.464 26.454 35 150 1484
Age 37.766 11.151 5 85 6385
Education 0.349 0.476 0 1 6385
Income 0.086 0.268 -0.278 3.995 6385
Income others 0.411 0.633 -0.317 14.103 6385
Dependency ratio 2.482 1.779 0 12 6285
Microfinance group 0.521 0.499 0 1 6385
NGO group 0.077 0.268 0 1 6385
Relatives group 0.357 0.479 0 1 6385
Commercial lender group 0.038 0.192 0 1 6385
Cooperatives of credit 0.004 0.063 0 1 6385
Bank availability 0.488 0.499 0 1 21643
Savings 0.027 0.045 0 0.855 6385
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Table 2. Logit regressions of default
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on the
reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix A.
For those regressions in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is restricted
to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for
previous dates. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coefficients
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -1.543*** -1.555*** -0.704* -0.973*
(0.0797) (0.132) (0.377) (0.568)
Average female wage 0.0110* 0.0304***
(0.00564) (0.00910)






Income others -0.100 0.0332
(0.121) (0.162)
Dependency ratio 0.110*** 0.120***
(0.0295) (0.0390)




Constant -1.020*** -2.398*** -2.103*** -3.698***
(0.0565) (0.262) (0.332) (0.571)
Observations 6385 3790 2828 1654
Pseudo R2 0.0792 0.125 0.0903 0.164
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Table 3. Regressions using dowry as a proxy of the outside option
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default
on the reported variables. This table shows the positive correlation between the variable Dowry and
Default. For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix A. For
those regressions in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is restricted
to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for
previous dates. Column (3) reports the estimates of an instrumental probit regression where Income is
instrumented by Dowry. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing
coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -1.565*** -1.617*** -0.064 -1.837*** -1.618*** -0.970
(0.0900) (0.156) (0.383) (0.280) (0.156) (0.605)
Dowry 0.345*** 0.367*** 0.425*** 0.317** 0.223
(0.0915) (0.118) (0.146) (0.130) (0.151)
Average male wage 0.0294***
(0.0105)
Average female wage 0.0222***
(0.00647)
Age 0.0124 -0.0038 0.00845 0.0131 -0.00291
(0.00879) (0.00523) (0.0169) (0.00887) (0.0144)
Income -0.129 1.949*** -1.303*** -0.135 -0.107
(0.187) (0.760) (0.322) (0.188) (0.239)
Income others -0.292* -1.146*** -0.287 -0.344
(0.174) (0.406) (0.175) (0.261)
Dependency ratio 0.0144 0.036 0.0118 0.0164 -0.0116
(0.0356) (0.0171) (0.0656) (0.0356) (0.0577)
Number of children 0.0837** 0.0521*** 0.143** 0.0843*** 0.0359
(0.0327) (0.0163) (0.0694) (0.0326) (0.0460)
Education 0.238** 0.0141 0.280 0.251** 0.0190
(0.117) (0.0603) (0.196) (0.118) (0.189)
Dummy Dowry 0.114
(0.144)
Constant -1.160*** -2.057*** -1.431*** -1.519*** -2.135*** -2.769***
(0.0670) (0.348) (0.190) (0.586) (0.364) (0.702)
Observations 5421 3221 3790 1186 3221 1401
Pseudo R2 0.0859 0.120 0.125 0.142 0.121 0.138
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Table 4. Means of the variables depending on the lender type
This table presents the means of Default Female Dowry Average wage female (awagef) and average
wage male (awagem) depending on the source of the loan. We report the ttest of the difference in
means when the source of the loan is a microfinance institution or not.
Group Default Female Dowry Awagef Awagem
Non microfinance 0.25 0.48 0.22 27.65 73.54
Microfinance institution 0.07 0.83 0.14 27.64 79.01
t-statistic 15.16 -25.75 5.57 0.03 -4.46
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Table 5. Regressions controlling for different sources of credit
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on
the reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables refer to Appendix A. We
report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coefficients significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.218 -0.492** -0.0281 -0.404
(0.181) (0.204) (0.679) (0.687)
Dowry 0.297** 0.248
(0.141) (0.177)
Average wage female 0.0304*** 0.0308***
(0.00941) (0.0108)
Average wage male 0.0196*** 0.0190***
(0.00715) (0.00695)
Age 0.0139*** -0.000291 0.00871 -0.0247
(0.00467) (0.00945) (0.00873) (0.0163)
Income 0.00445 -0.0394 -0.295 -0.271
(0.160) (0.178) (0.225) (0.236)
Income others -0.0465 -0.210 0.0964 -0.107
(0.0960) (0.163) (0.133) (0.240)
Dependency ratio 0.0917*** -0.000474 0.0479 -0.0824
(0.0296) (0.0377) (0.0421) (0.0590)
Number of children -0.00180 0.0913** -0.0549 0.0836
(0.0228) (0.0368) (0.0352) (0.0530)
Education -0.0227 0.0405 -0.256 -0.142
(0.118) (0.129) (0.189) (0.207)
microfinance -2.004*** -1.211** -1.941*** -1.379
(0.375) (0.515) (0.540) (0.869)
NGO -2.291*** -1.615*** -2.297*** -1.720*
(0.434) (0.567) (0.635) (0.947)
Relatives 0.537 1.057** 0.619 1.021
(0.367) (0.511) (0.500) (0.844)
Banks 0.0649 0.612 0.0737 0.569
(0.377) (0.521) (0.510) (0.852)
Constant -1.435*** -1.582** -2.109*** -1.439
(0.451) (0.616) (0.801) (1.100)
Observations 3790 3221 1654 1401
PseudoR2 0.228 0.204 0.259 0.228
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Table 6. Logit regressions of default for Grameen Bank borrowers
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on
the reported variables only for borrowers of the Grameen Bank. For an explanation of the construction of
the variables please refer to Appendix A. For those regressions in which controls other than Female and
Age are included the sample is restricted to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the
control variables were not available for previous dates. We report robust standard errors in parentheses
with *** ,**, * representing coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3)






Age -0.0102 -0.0288 -0.0126
(0.0109) (0.0186) (0.0181)
Income -0.358 -0.710* -0.655
(0.315) (0.398) (0.422)
Income others -1.216** -0.995** -0.476
(0.502) (0.482) (0.408)
Dependency ratio -0.00466 -0.0101 0.0539
(0.0610) (0.0677) (0.0682)
Number of children 0.0580 0.137** 0.0895
(0.0471) (0.0617) (0.0598)
Education -0.146 -0.119 -0.0737
(0.213) (0.224) (0.227)
Constant -1.734*** -1.213* -0.794
(0.519) (0.728) (0.729)
Observations 1966 1683 1683
Pseudo R2 0.0289 0.0418 0.0717
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Table 7. Regressions controlling for availability of banks
This table presents a logit regression with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on
the reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix
A. For those regressions in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is
restricted to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not
available for previous dates. This table shows the positive correlation between bank availability and
Default. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coefficients
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Table 8. Further tests of the model
This table presents the results of doing difference in means tests of the reported variables. We denote
as 1 those individuals for which the described condition is satisfied.
Description 0 1 p-value
Level of savings if the individual defaulted 0.029 0.017 1
Level of income if the individual defaulted 0.073 0.179 0
Level of income if the individual defaulted on a loan expected prior to 1998 0.061 0.11 0.002
Level of income when the individual committed early default by bank presence 0.065 0.15 0
Level of income when the individual did not default by bank presence 0.072 0.075 0.35
Savings when individual committed early default on a loan by bank presence 0.008 0.012 0.03
Savings when no default was committed on a loan by bank presence 0.034 0.036 0.13
Income when early default was committed on loan by bank presence 0.049 0.107 0
Income when no default was committed on a loan by bank presence 0.076 0.03 1
Savings if the individual has a loan from the Grameen Bank 0.02 0.033 0
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 1 If E chooses j = L and the project fails, E knows about her low skills. She
then does not realize any further projects. Therefore, consider the sequence t∗ = 1, 2, ... and the
set of assessments in which E chooses j = H in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t∗ − 1}, j = L in period t∗,
and no more projects thereafter. Denote by V (t
∗)
t the expected payoff of E at the beginning of





t∗yL − 1, (C.1)
and for t ∈ {1, ..., t∗ − 1}
V
(t∗)
t = (1− pH)θ˜Et yH − 1 + (1− (1− pH)θ˜Et )V (t
∗)
t+1 . (C.2)
For given α1 < 1, there is a finite period tˆ, such that θ˜Et yL − 1 < 0 and (1 − pH)θ˜Et yH − 1 <
0 for all t ≥ tˆ, regardless of the assessment. That is why V (t∗)1 is only positive for a finite
number of assessments with periods of project realizations t∗ ∈ {1, ..., t∗∗}. Pick two numbers
g1, g2 ∈ {1, ..., t∗∗} with g1 < g2. If V (g1)1 ≥ V (g2)1 , then we have V (g1)t ≥ V (g2)t for t ∈ {1, ..., g1}.
Otherwise, we would have
θ˜Eg1yL − 1 < (1− pH)θ˜Eg1yH − 1 + (1− (1− pH)θ˜Eg1)V (g2)g1+1,
which contradicts V (g1)1 ≥ V (g2)1 . Hence, E never can gain by switching from one assessment to
another after period 0. Because of the tie-breaking rule, we have
t¯α1 = min
{
g ∈ {1, ..., t∗∗} | V (g)1 ≥ V (t
∗)
1 , t
∗ ∈ {1, ..., t∗∗}
}
.
To prove the second claim, consider two assessments with g1, g2 ∈ N, g1 < g2, periods of project









yH − 11− pH
)
+ pgl−1H (yL − 1)










Note that V (t
∗)
1 is continuous in α1 for all t
∗ ∈ N. Thus, there is a αˆ1 < 1, such that V (g2)1 > V (g1)1
whenever α1 > αˆ1 and therefore t¯α1 > g1.
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Proof of Lemma 2 Assume that the equilibrium is as stated in the claim. As banks make zero profits







and for t < t¯,





+ (1− (1− pH)θ˜Et )Vt+1. (C.4)
First, consider the last period t¯: as in Lemma 1, (A1) ensures that E chooses j = L in period t¯,
given that banks do not finance projects in future periods. Next, focus on a period t < t¯. If E




, since no loans will


















yH − 11− pH
)
+ pt¯−tH (yL − 1) > yL − 1.
Note that Vt is continuous in α1. Thus, (C.5) holds if α1 is sufficiently close to unity.
Proof of Proposition 2 In any sequential equilibrium, we have θ˜Et = θ˜
Bk
t for all k ∈ {1, ..., N} and
all periods t. From assumption (A1) if follows that in the last period of an equilibrium, in which
projects are financed by banks, E chooses j = L. It is also clear that in the periods before this
last period, E chooses j = H. Otherwise, banks would not finance projects any longer. Consider
therefore the sequence t∗ = 1, 2, ... and the set of assessments in which E chooses j = H in periods
t ∈ {1, ..., t∗ − 1}, j = L in period t∗ and banks finance all projects in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t∗},
but not in periods t ∈ {t∗ + 1, t∗ + 2, ...}. Denote by V (t∗)t the expected payoff of E in period
t ∈ {1, ..., t∗} under the assessment with t∗ periods of project financing. As banks make expected











and for t ∈ {1, ..., t∗ − 1}
V
(t∗)





+ (1− (1− pH)θ˜Et )V (t
∗)
t+1 . (C.7)
Note that (C.6) equals (C.1) and (C.7) equals (C.2) from the proof of Proposition 1. Thus, V (t
∗)
t
is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1 for all t ∈ {1, ..., t∗} and for all t∗ .
As θ˜Et∗ → 0 for t∗ →∞, at least one of the following statements must be true for each assessment



















This assessment cannot be a Nash equilibrium as E would choose j = L in period τ . It also




This assessment cannot be a Nash equilibrium as banks would not any finance projects in period




This assessment cannot be a Nash equilibrium as banks would not finance projects with high risk
in period τ . It also cannot be the first-best. (4.) The assessment is a Nash equilibrium. Denote
by t∗max the maximal number of periods in which projects are financed and the corresponding
assessment is an equilibrium. Note that t∗max is well-defined as α1 ∈ I(θL, yL). Then, this
assessment must be the only sequential equilibrium outcome. To see why, consider an alternative
Nash equilibrium with t∗ < t∗max periods of project-financing. E can gain by choosing j = H
in the periods t ∈ {t∗, ..., t∗max − 1}, j = L in period t∗max. As beliefs must be given by Bayes’
rule and E’s decisions are observable, banks cannot credibly threat to stop financing projects (by
offering loan contracts with expected zero-profits) in these periods. Otherwise, the assessment
with t∗max periods of project financing would not be an equilibrium, as statement (1.) and/or
(2.) and/or (3.) would be true. It remains to show that t∗max = t¯α1 : t
∗
max ≥ t¯α1 follows from the
equivalence of expected payoffs (as stated above) and the fact that statements (1.) to (3.) are
not true for any period t ∈ {1, ..., t¯α1 − 1} of an assessment with less than t¯α1 periods of project
financing. t∗max ≤ t¯α1 follows from the equivalence of expected payoffs (as stated above) and the
fact that any assessment with more than t¯α1 periods of project financing violates statement (1.).
Thus, we have t∗max = t¯α1 .
Proof of Lemma 4 We must have θ˜Et = θ˜
Bk
t for k ∈ {1, ..., N} and all periods t of a sequential
equilibrium. If E sticks to the proposed strategy, her expected payoffs are as in the proof of
Lemma 2, i.e. equations (C.3) and (C.4). First, consider the last period t = t¯. As in Lemma 3,
(A1) ensures that E chooses j = L, as Vt¯+1 = 0. Next, focus on period t¯− 1. If E chooses j = L
in period t¯ − 1 and she fails, then she and her bank, say Bl, know that she has low skills, i.e.
α˜Et¯ = α˜
Bl
t¯ = 0. Yet, she may get credit from another bank, for example Bk, k 6= l, in period t¯.


















if (A2) holds. Thus, if α1 is sufficiently large, then E chooses j = H in period t¯ − 1. By going
through the same steps, one can show that E chooses j = H in all periods t < t¯ if α1 is sufficiently
large.
Proof of Lemma 6 We must have θ˜Et = θ˜
Bk
t for k ∈ {1, ..., N} and all periods t of a sequential
equilibrium. Assume that E acts as stated in the claim. Banks charge loan rates rkt , k ∈
{1, ..., N}, t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}, such that they make zero-profits in expectation. Denote by Vt the
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corresponding expected payoff of E at the beginning of period t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}. For period t¯,
the proof proceeds as for Lemma 5. Next, focus on a period t < t¯. Note that E has private
information about her probability of success whenever she deviates from the equilibrium path
in these periods: if she chooses j = L, and this project fails, then she knows that she has low
skills. However, as banks do not observe E’s decisions, the loan rates in the next periods are not
affected by E’s risk choice. Denote by V˜t the expected payoff of E at the beginning of period
t ∈ {2, ..., t¯} if she knows for sure that she has low skills but follows the equilibrium path of play.
Trivially, it holds that Vt > V˜t. E chooses j = H in period t if




V˜t+1 ≤ (1− pH)θ˜Et (yH − rkt ) +
(
1− (1− pH) θ˜Et
)
Vt+1.
If α1 is sufficiently large, then this inequality is implied by
(yL − rkt ) < (1− pH)(yH − rkt ).
Rearranging terms gives
rkt >
yL − (1− pH)yH
pH
. (C.8)
Recall the loan rate in period t is given by (4.9). Assumption (A2∗) ensures that inequality (C.8)
holds if α1 is sufficiently large. Thus, if (A1∗) and (A2∗) hold and α1 is sufficiently high, then E
chooses j = H in periods t ∈ {1, ..., t¯− 1} and j = L in period t¯ .
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